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EDITORIAL

MORAL NEUTRALITY

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d Reagan mounting the bully pulpit
rkly of Communists who "don't be-
afterlife," and *Pravda* hitting back
age stories on "war hysteria" in the
es, a revival of the 1950s cold-war
pon us, and possibly the reality as
last week's conference of the non-
ons inevitably brought to mind a
John Foster Dulles once applied to
s—"immoral neutrality."

Cold War II chill that is rapidly set-
trality seems about as immoral as
of the way of two onrushing trucks
a course. Although they have plenty
among themselves, the ninety-four
gathered last week in New Delhi are
ommon fear of conflict between the

Their trepidation is not irrational, what with a nasty little war in Afghanistan, storm clouds gathering over Poland and American advisers and arms in El Salvador. Great-power intervention may be more in style now than it was back in the 1950s. The superpowers thrash about, goaded by the stings of popular protest movements. All this serves to increase tension, and hence the likelihood of nuclear war.

But, much more so than in the 1950s, the neutral nations have a useful diplomatic role to play on the world stage. This role may be the modest one of go-between, such as Algeria took in the hostage crisis, or it may be a far more difficult undertaking, such as the efforts being made by Pakistan's foreign minister Agha Shahi to explore a negotiated withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. (A Finlandized Afghanistan is surely preferable to protracted counterinsurgency war.) Certainly, Third World diplomacy seems to be the only game in town these days, other than Russian-U.S. roulette.

26th C. P. CONGRESS
Jerry F. Hough

ENTERPRISE JOBS ZONES
Stanley Aronowitz & Cary Goodman

PRIVACY AND THE FIRST
Aryeh Neier

AMERICAN PROMISE
Edward Hoagland

U.S. ARMY INC.
Paul L. Savage

HANNAH ARENDT
Elisabeth Young-Bruehl

THE PARTY'S NOT OVER

THE FUTURE POLITICS OF LIBERALISM

TOM HAYDEN

What the conservatives called "bleeding heart liberalism" finally hemorrhaged and died in 1980. The post-mortem will determine the prospects of the future opposition.

Some will say, of course, that the corpse is not dead. They will say that Jimmy Carter failed, but not liberalism. Or that the liberals were outspent, and perhaps outorganized, but not outargued. A new face, a new leader, a few patches in the party platform and a liberal restoration will be assured.

There are others, myself included, who feel that the deeper causes of liberalism's death were from within, in the crumbling world view and program of the liberals which made Reagan's nostalgic conservatism look crisp, modern and downright hopeful by comparison.

Just how far the Reagan Administration will get in carrying out its programs will depend on many conditions at home and abroad, but a major variable will be what kind of opposition to Reaganism develops in our politics and whether it is capable of becoming a real (and electable) alternative.

It is conceivable that Ronald Reagan's most irrational policies will provoke a reaction from the more "rational" elements of the economic and political structure, just as Richard Nixon's excessive repression caused opposition from *The Washington Post, The New York Times*, the Democrats in Congress and whatever institutional interests they represent. In this case, a "new governing coalition" would be formed to compete in the 1984 elections, built primarily around a possibly bipartisan anti-Reagan consensus.

(Continued on Page 208)

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LETTERS.

TRILATERAL SOCIALISTS?

Durham, N.C.

In his article on the Institute for Democratic Socialism's recent Eurosocialism in America conference ["The Socialists Go to Washington," *The Nation*, Dec. 27, 1980], Ronald Radosh complains about the lack of coverage by the press and the apparent indifference or opposition on the part of A.F.L.-C.I.O. top leadership. He implies that the conference was too hot, too radical, for either to handle. Perhaps, for some. But the event was most certainly not too radical for everybody. Radosh for some reason fails to mention, much less tries to explain, the fact that the conference was funded by the German Marshall Fund of the United States, an outfit that also provides financial support for the Trilateral Commission, among other needy organizations. Trustees of the Marshall Fund include some of the most powerful people in international finance, such as C. Douglas Dillon, W. Averell Harriman, Gabriel Hauge, John J. McCloy, James A. Perkins and Trilateral chairman David Rockefeller. The fund's chairman, until three months ago, was William Matson Roth, executive committee member of the Trilateral Commission and top official of the family firm, Matson Navigation. And the fund's president and program coordinator, Gerald Livingston and Peter Weitz, both serve as consultants to the Trilateral Commission. . . .

The fact that trade unionists Joyce Miller and Irving Bluestone are also Marshall Fund trustees, or that trade unionists Lane Kirkland, I.W. Abel, Sol Chaikin, Glenn Watts and Leonard Woodcock have all been members of the Trilateral Commission, does not mean that either organization has revolutionary leanings, or even that they are pro-labor. What, then, in the eyes of the Marshall Fund philanthropists, do the Trilateral Commission and the Institute for Democratic Socialism's conference have in common, to make them both eligible for support? It is a question well worth pondering. Lest we forget, European social democracy is neither especially democratic (particularly in Germany) nor is it socialism. This is no accident nor the unfortunate result of a lack of fervor or fortune. Social democratic unions and labor parties in postwar Europe were themselves to a significant degree elements of counterrevolution, one orchestrated in large part by the very Marshall Plan administrators who now serve as trustees of the German Marshall Fund (the fund was established in 1972 by the German Government to commemorate the Marshall Plan), together with the more elitist, statist-oriented and ambitious leaders of labor and the left. The outcome was predictable, and it wasn't socialism.

How many times must socialists make the same mistake? Trilateralism and democratic socialism mix only at the expense of both democracy and socialism, not to mention at the expense of the rank-and-file and revolutionary struggles that lie beyond the pale of Trilateralist "interdependence" and so-called "planetary humanism". . . . However earnest and well-intentioned they might be, the conferees—and by his sin of omission Radosh as well—apparently must still come to grips with the hard-won fact that democratic socialism cannot be won from above, even given the resources of David Rockefeller and the German Government. At the very least, it is a problem of definition. *David F. Noble*

RADOSH REPLIES

New York City

It is ironic to find that the former Mellon Fellow in Humanities and Engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the recipient as well of a major grant from the Manpower Administration of the U.S. Department of Labor seeks to call into question the substance of a conference because of the source of its funding. Surely Noble knows what *is* important is whether any control was exercised over contents, speakers and program. And he has offered no evidence—for there is none—to indicate that any institution other than the Institute for Democratic Socialism was fully in control. Or are we to conclude that Noble's own work at M.I.T. was conducted on behalf of the corporate benefactors of his position?

In his own important book, *America by Design: Science, Technology and the Rise of Corporate Capitalism*, Noble has written wisely that "for most historians of the modern period, a more or less crude determinism has become a staple of explanation." Evidently, Noble is himself not immune from that methodology. In his letter, he tries unsuccessfully to convey the impression that the Eurosocialism in America conference was a creation of the Trilateral Commission—a favorite of both left and right conspiracy theorists—which valued the chance to push social democracy as an alternative to real rank-and-file and revolutionary activity.

What he carefully ignores discussing is precisely what my report *was* about—the substance of the conference. Again, the meeting was a broad-based event that included major leaders from the left wing of the socialist spectrum, like Tony Benn of the Labor Party. It also focused attention on support of the Nicaraguan revolution and on the demands made by the Democratic Revolutionary Front of El Salvador (trilateralism?). As for Noble's characterization of social democracy, he is free to analyze that movement as he wishes. But as a historian, he reveals a strange inability to notice the changed world situation since the late 1940s, as well as the movement *away* from social democracy and toward democratic socialism on the part of many parties affiliated with the Socialist International.

Most important, Noble cannot explain why the conference was indeed actively opposed by Lane Kirkland, and why *The New York Times* and the TV networks blacked it out entirely. Nor does it fit his thesis to find that *Barron's* financial weekly characterized the meeting as that of "hard-line" socialists concerned with the sins of "militarism, monetarism and multinationalism." That magazine had praise only for the technocrat "socialist" Michel Rocard, whom they saw as the "sole voice" in opposition to the "ideological hard line." One would imagine that if the Trilateral Commission was so powerful, they would have managed to get their own press solidly behind the conference. It certainly could have used better and more favorable press coverage.

Noble, finally, has the right to adhere to the "revolutionary" course—whatever he means by that. I think that is a chimera, and prefer the strategy laid out by Olof Palme of taking "one step at a time" and of respecting democratic traditions. This is a matter of political difference and of strategy, and the reasons for preferring such a path have little to do with David Rockefeller, the Trilateral Commission, or the German Government. *Ronald Radosh*

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EDITORIALS.

The Worst Yet

As Ernest W. Lefever sees it, "Economic and military aid should be given or withheld to encourage sound external practices, but not to reform domestic institutions or practices, however obnoxious" (*The New York Times,* January 24, 1977). Under that formula, any despot systematically engaged in torture, murder, or even genocide, is eligible for American economic and military assistance so long as he proclaims that he is on the side of the United States and against the Soviet Union.

Lefever, of course, is President Reagan and Secretary of State Haig's choice to be Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. Even in the long procession of Reagan appointees professing their antagonism to the objectives of the agencies they have been chosen to lead, Lefever stands out. He is an outspoken apologist for the barbarous practices of right-wing dictatorships. If the choice of a man to fill this post were delegated to a search committee consisting of President Chun of South Korea, Prime Minister Botha of South Africa and President Pinochet of Chile, Lefever is the man one would expect them to appoint.

Not that the Reagan Administration has left us in doubt where it stands on human rights. United Nations Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick published an article in the January *Commentary* attacking the Carter Administration for not keeping the Somoza regime in power in Nicaragua. More recently, President Reagan held up publication of a State Department report on human rights required by the Foreign Assistance Act in order to avoid embarrassing President Chun during his visit to the United States. And Secretary Haig has said that American foreign policy will concern itself with terrorism instead of human rights

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because, in his view, terrorism is the ultimate human-rights violation.

Much of the criticism of the Administration decision to downgrade human rights focuses, rightly, on its immorality, but it should also be criticized on another ground: its stupidity. Haig's statement about terrorism is a good example. As anyone who has studied contemporary terrorism is aware, one of its central purposes is to provoke a country's rulers into flagrant violations of human rights. Indeed, terrorism is sometimes defined as violent acts designed to cause alarm far greater than the physical harm they produce; the purpose is to goad governments to such an extent that they abandon ordinary restraints and make an all-out effort to apprehend and punish the perpetrators or anyone suspected of aiding them or even sympathizing with them. Terrorists resort to terrorism because they lack sufficient popular support to gain power through the ballot or through wars. When governments respond brutally, with force disproportionate to the threat, they discredit themselves with the people. This in turn stimulates the growth of opposition and enables the most extreme group—which is inevitably the terrorists—to seize leadership of the opposition. This is the way terrorism works in such disparate settings as Israel, Northern Ireland and many countries in Latin America.

To avoid this trap, a government's only alternative is to proceed against terrorists firmly but fairly. They cannot be ignored, of course, but in the long run, when they enjoy some measure of popular support, they can only be defeated by governments that do not abandon human rights while proceeding against them. The foreign policy favored by Haig, Kirkpatrick and, most extremely of all, by Lefever, calls for American aid to governments that practice the most brutal suppression of human rights. It is exactly such practices that terrorists welcome. If the United States is involved in the repression, so much the better; the terrorists can add anti-Americanism to their popular appeal.

Since Haig and Kirkpatrick have already been confirmed, there is nothing that can be done about them except to monitor closely their acts and criticize them when they behave immorally, or stupidly, or both. Lefever's appointment must still be approved by the Senate, however, which has supinely approved every Reagan nominee thus far. Despite this record, a fight over the Lefever nomination would be worthwhile. In addition to being the least qualified appointee imaginable to promote human rights, Lefever is vulnerable to attack for his conduct while head of the Ethics and Public Policy Center in Washington, D.C. As Morton Mintz documented in *The Washington Post* of January 4, Lefever obtained a $25,000 tax-deductible contribution from the Nestlé Company, then launched a campaign to discredit the World Council of Churches boycott of Nestlé's infant formula.

Lefever's anti-human-rights stand ought to be enough to stop his appointment, but it probably isn't. His unethical practices as head of a self-proclaimed ethics center, however, might be. On whatever ground, if he could be rejected, it would be a small but clear message to totalitarian forces the world over.

Burger's War

Chief Justice Warren Burger has declared the first "war" of the new Administration. Of course the Supreme Court stands apart from any Administration, by law and custom, but seldom has a speech by the highest judicial officer so closely followed the election returns, as the old saying goes.

The Burger War is against "crime and the fear of crime." He told the American Bar Association in Houston that we must resist a "reign of terror" in the streets lest an "impotent" society become "hostage" to criminals. Victory in this war would come when offenders were stopped from constant appeals and treated with "finality." It was a nice collection of the current code words in Washington. Decoded, they mean "law 'n' order."

The martial analogy is appropriate in a week when we learned that the Pentagon will ask for $32 billion more from what the Reaganites call the "bloated" Federal budget. Tom Wicker's *New York Times* column of February 10 was headed "Burger's Call to Arms" and Prof. Alan Dershowitz of Harvard said it was "highly inappropriate for the Chief Justice to become the general in the war against crime."

The Chief Justice's call to arms on the home crime front followed the current Reagan-Haig line in other deft ways. For example, he managed to ring in the current preoccupation with "international terrorism," by comparing it with the "day-to-day terrorism in almost any large city." The latter, he said (correctly), causes more deaths than the former (certainly more American deaths). "Why," Burger asked, "do we show such indignation and alarm over alien terrorists and such passive tolerance for the domestic variety? Must we be hostages within the borders of our own self-styled enlightened, civilized country?" And so the analogy came to an elegant full circle, with a picture of America Held Hostage (Day what?) by "terrorists," while government wrings its hands with "passive tolerance." Just as Secretary of State Haig had invoked terrorism to justify downplaying human rights, so Burger summoned it forth to attack the "massive safeguards for accused persons." Among these were bail-relief laws—a much-needed reform intended to repair a fundamental unfairness in the system whereby the poor are incarcerated because they cannot raise bail. The Chief Justice was also worried by prisoners' appeals, which "encourage prisoners to continue warfare with society" through endless petitions on "technicalities." One wonders if, under this definition, the landmark *Gideon* case—a pauper's appeal brought by a prisoner—would have ever been heard. Or if the present Court would consider denial of the right to counsel a "technicality."

In a further analogy to current budgetary thinking within the Administration, Burger warned against the "cliché" that "if we but abolish poverty, crime will also disappear." Thus, in the name of "national security" against the domestic terrorists in our cities, we simply beef up "defense spending" for police and forget about poverty. Dave Stockman

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must have loved that line, for it will allow him to cut Federal job programs and the like with a clean conscience. The word is out: we no longer have to "buy off" the poor in hopes of peace; just add more police. Thus, Burger has, wittingly or not, provided the missing domestic piece in the Reagan scenario. If the ghettos explode as a result of cuts in social programs, there will be adequate security forces to contain them.

Burger's war against "double-digit crime inflation" will not be cheap. He said it will cost us "more money than . . . ever before." Lawyers will debate its import but it seems certain greatly to increase plea bargaining (and therefore reduce the number of trials) in criminal cases. Historians will rack their brains for another example of a Chief Justice advocating reduced rights for defendants while treating lawyers as "ministers of justice" (that is, officers of the court more than advocates).

Burger's battle cry—"we must try to deter and try to cure"—was not judicial, judicious or just.

Unleashing Greed

Nearly the worst news about President Reagan's speech to the nation last week was the proof it offered that the man believes his own campaign speeches. The really bad news is that he seems to have swallowed whole the rhetoric, attitudes and contents of the notorious Stockman-Kemp memorandum entitled "Avoiding a G.O.P. Economic Dunkirk," which was presented "confidentially" to Mr. Reagan by the perpetrators late last November and since then extensively leaked to the media. David Stockman is now, of course, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and his former colleague Jack Kemp has been promoted to the number-three slot in the Republican leadership hierarchy of the House of Representatives.

These men of great clout selected the Dunkirk metaphor to dramatize their conviction that the American economy was beset by a crisis of inflation, unemployment, slow growth, inadequate investment and saving, and bloated government. The President's reference in his speech to "economic calamity" echoed their perturbation. The Stockman-Kemp remedies, the core of supply-side economics, were four in number. In rough order of priority, major tax cuts came first, both the three-year Kemp-Roth schedule of annual 10 percent reductions in personal income levies and liberalized depreciation. A close second was severe curtailment of nondefense spending, in particular job programs like CETA, urban programs like mass transit and entitlement programs like food stamps, Medicaid, unemployment compensation and aid to the disabled. The last category was especially suspect because it allegedly discourages the work ethic and enlarges the tax burdens of the energetic.

Next came deregulation. The Washington University economist Murray Weidenbaum, now chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, acquired a degree of fame in private life from his estimate that the costs of compliance with environmental and other varieties of regulation cost American employers in the private sector a cool $100 billion each year, the very number cited by the President.

Monetary policy, the final item, was severely Friedmanite. The Fed was enjoined to enlarge the volume of money and credit no faster than the growth of real output after inflation. When the gross national product rises 2 percent in real terms and inflation soars at a 12 percent pace, the monetarist prescription translates into a credit crunch and a prime rate of interest calculated to make all parties sigh for the good old days of Carter economic policies.

The scheme is a trifle hard on low-income individuals, laid-off steel and auto workers and hard-pressed communities in the Northeast and industrial Midwest. Let these constituencies possess their souls in patience. Lower taxes will encourage productive investment, faster growth and improved productivity, a veritable return to the Golden Age of the 1950s. Curtailed social benefits will stimulate the lazy and unproductive to become useful citizens, or starve. As Malthus well said, "At nature's great table, there are no places set for some." Or as that latter-day prophet, Eisenhower's Defense Secretary Charles Wilson, phrased it, hunting dogs are to be preferred to kennel dogs. Much as John Foster Dulles, Wilson's Cabinet colleague, threatened to unleash Chiang Kai-shek upon the Chinese Communists, the supply-siders yearn to unleash the private sector. The results are likely to be equally impressive. [See Stanley Aronowitz and Cary Goodman on page 207.]

Of course, supply-side theory is untested except in Margaret Thatcher's Britain, where the consequences include double-digit unemployment, high inflation and spreading bankruptcies. For that matter, American taxes are not especially high by global standards. In booming Japan, environmental regulation is stricter than it is here. Moreover, tax cuts at best will increase consumer spending and administer an unneeded extra stimulus to inflation long before the conjectural productivity gains from larger investment could possibly be realized.

No matter. For men and women of faith, the new economic revelation is a banner and a cause. Last week, Ronald Reagan enrolled himself in the company of these true believers. Although much of his mercifully brief address recounted a string of horror tales about the growth of Federal debt and its asserted connection with inflation, the Chief Executive (Chief Communicator?) was specific on two important points. He promised to ask Congress this week to enact the full Kemp-Roth three-year tax reductions. And without emphasis, he indicated willingness to accept tax cuts before parallel reductions in nondefense outlays. Thus the Stockman-Kemp group for the time being at least defeated the more cautious veterans of the Nixon-Ford era who preferred to cut spending and balance the budget before reducing taxes—leafy vegetables before chocolate sundaes.

On the spending side, the President was disingenuous as well as vague. To say that reductions will occur only in the rate of growth of Federal expenditures is to obscure the fact that Federal spending, which grows more slowly than infla-

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tion, results in the unavoidable contraction of what the dollars can actually purchase. Moreover, if defense appropriations rise—a topic to which Reagan conspicuously did not allude—the conclusion is inescapable that the carnage will be savage in the social sector.

No one can say with complete certainty that this voyage into uncharted economic waters will end on the rocks, but one thing should be clear. For all its veneer of novelty, supply-side economics amounts to an updated version of the trickle-down theory of prosperity that routed Herbert Hoover and exiled Republicans from national office for two decades. The benefits of liberalized depreciation, lower taxes on large incomes and laxer regulation will accrue quickly and massively to stockholders, corporate executives and other affluent types. The costs will afflict the poor, the unemployed, the young, the female and the black. Those unwise enough to combine in themselves several of these individual characteristics will suffer most acutely.

As the bitter Wobbly song ran, "you'll get pie in the sky when you die." There is pie on earth for the unneedy in the Reagan regime and short rations for everybody else.

ROBERT LEKACHMAN

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ARTICLES.

26TH PARTY CONGRESS

The Graying of The Soviet Union

JERRY F. HOUGH

As the Soviet Union approaches the fourth leadership change in its history, it faces a series of policy choices as momentous as any since Stalin's death or perhaps even the 1920s. The Soviet Union has basically made the transition from a developing country to an industrial nation, from a country of uneducated peasants to one whose youth now usually have secondary education, from a second-rate European power to a military superpower.

Despite these enormous changes, however, the Soviet Union retains a system of economic incentives that is more appropriate for mobilizing illiterate peasants to produce basic goods. It retains a set of military priorities appropriate for a weak country in great danger. In its foreign policy, it reacts with the knee-jerk anti-Americanism of the 1940s. This was the case even in the Iranian hostage crisis, when it had a perfect chance to pick up good will in the United States and at the same time damn religious activists in politics. Its military equivalency has blinded its leaders to the country's economic inferiority (its G.N.P. stands at 60 percent of America's), and this has lured it into a foreign policy that is beyond its means.

The Brezhnev leadership has been putting off decisions as long as possible, but the problems are progressively becoming worse. In Poland, for example, the price of meat has been kept constant in the state stores, while the payments farmers receive have increased. As a result, the state now sells meat for one-half the price it pays for it (the difference between the purchase and the sales prices equals some 5 percent of G.N.P.). Predictably, there are widespread shortages in the stores, and the regime is spending valuable foreign currency to buy feed to try to keep up the supply of this half-price meat.

A series of events seems to be converging to force the Soviet Union to some decision. The most important is the impending drop in the number of young people becoming 18 years old. In the late 1970s, approximately 2,650,000 men reached the age of 18 each year, but by the mid-1980s this will drop to two million a year. Since this is (after normal deferments) less than the Soviet Union is currently drafting each year, the economic cost of maintaining such a large army in the face of a growing labor shortage will greatly increase. The pressure to change an economic incentive system that discourages managers from economizing on labor will also grow.

The failure to make hard policy decisions has been accompanied by (and probably caused by) a lack of new blood in the leadership. Leonid Brezhnev has been General Secretary since 1964, the year Ronald Reagan entered politics with his famous speech for Barry Goldwater. He was the Soviet equivalent of a U.S. governor (provincial party first secretary) when Thomas Dewey was Governor of New York. Aleksei Kosygin was appointed the country's top light industry administrator in 1939, and his successor as chairman of the Council of Ministers, Nikolai Tikhonov, has been in steel industry administration for fifty years, the last twenty as the country's top steel executive.

In foreign affairs, the Soviet Union's foreign minister became head of the American desk of the ministry in 1939, first deputy minister in 1949 and minister in 1957. Its minister of defense became a defense industry minister in 1941 and has remained at this level or higher ever since. The man in charge of ideology and relations with Communists (Mikhail Suslov) has been a Central Committee secretary in this area since 1947, and his chief deputy (Boris Ponomarev) was working for the executive committee of the Comintern in 1936.

Jerry F. Hough is professor of political science at Duke University and the author of How the Soviet Union Is Governed *(Harvard University Press) and* Soviet Leadership in Transition *(Brookings).*

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These men are all part of a generation that received its college education at the beginning of the industrialization drive of the late 1920s and early 1930s; they were elevated to high posts during the Great Purge while still in their early and middle 30s. They are the generation associated most profoundly and personally with the priorities and imperatives of industrialization and catching up with the West militarily. One has a deep sense that they will never assimilate the imperatives of a very different time.

It is in this setting that the Twenty-Sixth Party Congress will open in Moscow on February 23. Since the Party Congress is the body with supreme power within the Soviet political system, it would seem the natural place for a discussion of national priorities and for the selection of younger leaders more in tune with the realities of military equality and the need for economic modernization. Yet it would be a monumental surprise if this happened.

During the 1920s the congresses were, in fact, tumultuous affairs at which great issues were discussed and Stalin's opponents were defeated. But precisely because the Party Congress (or convention, to use a more apposite American term) is the supreme authority, the party leaders from the beginning have acted to gut the democratic procedures by which delegates are supposed to be elected. The delegates are named at regional party conferences, and thus are basically under the control of the regional party bosses, who themselves are centrally appointed. Since Lenin's death, the General Secretary has been the most important man in the political system precisely because he has had the responsibility of supervising the provincial party organs and thus has had the ability to build a machine among their secretaries.

The Twenty-Sixth Congress will feature three major events: the Central Committee report delivered by Brezhnev, the report on the five-year plan delivered by Nikolai Tikhonov, and the election of the Central Committee at the end of the congress. It is no mere formality that the Brezhnev speech is termed the Central Committee report. The speech is a committee document, and hundreds of people have been drafting the various sections over recent months. (For example, Georgii Arbatov, the director of the Institute of the USA and Canada, is said to have spent considerable time last fall in a Central Committee *dacha* outside Moscow with the group working on the foreign policy sections.)

Brezhnev's speech is likely to contain very direct warnings to the United States and Poland, and it may make a real effort to stir up patriotism at home as a prelude to demanding greater sacrifices from the Russian people. Especially in light of the recently enunciated hard-line policy of the Reagan Administration, the most probable Soviet solution to its problems is to invade Poland and then use the expected Western reaction as the excuse to take the kind of draconian one-shot economic measures that are necessary for reform—for example, a sharp increase in meat prices.

In the main, however, Brezhnev's speech will be rather general and contradictory. The General Secretary will come out for a powerful defense and for arms control, for stronger central planning and for a greater role for provincial government and plant managers, for protection of individual rights and for law and order. He will vigorously defend Soviet support for national liberation movements and call for an improvement in relations with the West.

Brezhnev will make little effort to reconcile these goals or strike a balance between them. Indeed, it is precisely such a blurring of the party line that is one of the main purposes of the speech. The technique is a traditional instrument for opening up the published debates during the time between congresses. People who want to advance differing views can support their positions with the appropriate quotation from Brezhnev's speech and thus acknowledge party supremacy while calling for a change in specific policy.

Tikhonov's report on the five-year plan will be more specific in its targets, but it too is the product of a long planning process and its general outlines have already been published. It basically will project a continuation of the trends of the late 1970s. Yet, while it will show that the present leadership has not faced up to the new dilemmas, it really has limited long-term significance. In 1976, the congress called for 620 million to 640 million tons of oil in 1980, 790 million to 810 million tons of coal and 400 billion to 435 billion cubic meters of natural gas. The actual production turned out to be 603 million tons of oil, 716 million tons of coal and 435 billion cubic meters of natural gas, and in part these reflect changes in investment decisions since 1976.

Although the ambivalences and contradictions in Brezhnev's speech will help open up debate after the congress, little dissent will surface at the congress itself. If the past is any guide, the only serious criticisms of Soviet policy will come from foreign Communists, who—both for the audience in

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Moscow and at home—may want to convey their feelings about intervention in Afghanistan and Poland. It is in their speeches and the response to them that the only controversy of the congress may occur.

In any long-term perspective, the most important event at the meeting will be the selection of the Central Committee. The Central Committee is the top political authority in the country between congresses, and it is the body with the authority to elect and dismiss Politburo members and Central Committee secretaries. With a mandate that lasts until 1986, the new Central Committee will almost surely have the responsibility of naming Brezhnev's successor as General Secretary.

The Central Committee membership is likely to be as predictable as Brezhnev's speech. Except for ten workers and peasants, the present Central Committee is composed overwhelmingly of top governmental and party officials in Moscow and the provinces, with some military, diplomatic and scientific representation thrown in. In a very large number of cases, membership in the Central Committee goes automatically to holders of the most important posts in the country (some 270 of them in 1976, but the number given this honor has been growing over the years).

The turnover in posts with ex officio Central Committee membership has been extremely low in the Brezhnev period, and a good deal of what has occurred has involved shifts among high posts. Ninety-one percent of the officials who were elected full members of the Central Committee in 1971, and who were still alive in 1976 were re-elected to the Central Committee in that year. Today just over 80 percent of the full members elected in 1976 hold posts that should guarantee their re-election, or 88 percent of the 1976 members who are still alive.

As a result, the Central Committee that must select the next political leaders has been aging along with the leadership, although the Committee members are not as old overall. The average age of the full members was 56 in 1966 and 63 at the beginning of this year. If the present balance of institutional representation is maintained, approximately 305 members will be elected, some sixty of them replacements for members who have died, retired or been transferred. The departing members average 68 years of age, and their likely replacements around 54. This will drop the average age of the Central Committee to 61, and a decline to 60 is possible if the practice of expanding the size of the Central Committee is continued. If the leadership decided to increase worker representation in response to Polish events, that might also have an impact.

Immediately after the conclusion of the congress, the Central Committee will meet to select the Politburo and the Secretariat. There is no necessity for any changes in membership in this session, but in the past some have usually occurred. The new first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers (the 73-year-old Ivan Arkhipov) will surely become either a full or candidate member. It would not be in the least surprising if the trade union chairman were to become a member, and one or two of the older members (perhaps even Suslov or conceivably Andrei Kirilenko) might be retired or removed to more ceremonial posts.

Any threat to Brezhnev's own position would, however, represent a major reversal. With two close cronies (Kirilenko and Konstantin Chernenko) already in top positions in the Central Committee Secretariat, he has acted in the last months to move two men he knew in Dnepropetrovsk in the 1930s (Tikhonov and Arkhipov) into the top two spots in the Government. The Central Committee members who have profited from his policy of personnel stability will have little incentive to challenge the status quo now, unless they think that he has lost the ability to handle the Polish situation.

The real crisis will come when Brezhnev dies or is removed after a collapse of his health. He has been in power for so long that he will make an excellent scapegoat for the lack of reform at home, or to cloak a major foreign policy shift, such as re-establishing relations with China and/or the West (especially after the likely invasion of Poland). The logical successor at that time would be Mikhail Gorbachev, a vigorous and well-educated 50-year-old now serving as Central Committee secretary for agriculture. (Or perhaps K.G.B. chairman Yuri Andropov or the first secretary of Moscow, Victor Grishin, might serve as a transitional leader, with Gorbachev working as second secretary for an interim period.)

But the aging Politburo, only three of whose fourteen members were born after 1914, may well try to hold on. One would think that the Central Committee members' concern for the stability of the system as a whole—and for their very lives if it falls—would frighten them away from replacing Brezhnev with yet another member of his generation, but the short-term political interest of many in the Central Committee might be to accommodate the Politburo's aversion to change. For this reason, the leadership decision that the newly elected Central Committee will eventually have to make—and its aftermath—will provide all the high drama that the Twenty-Sixth Congress will almost surely lack. □

PRIVACY AND THE FIRST

Criminal Records—Off the Record

ARYEH NEIER

The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press describes itself as an "association of working news reporters and editors dedicated to defending First Amendment and freedom of information interests of the public to know about the operations of all forms of government." This worthy enterprise has on its steering committee such media luminaries as Tom

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Brokaw, Walter Cronkite, Lyle Denniston, Jack Nelson, Howard K. Smith, Lesley Stahl, Barbara Walters and Bob Woodward—not to mention several journalists whose bylines grace the pages of *The Nation* from time to time, including Nat Hentoff and J. Anthony Lukas. The director of the Reporters Committee (and also its founder) is Jack C. Landau, a correspondent for the Newhouse Newspapers and a one-time aide to Attorney General John Mitchell.

Among the obstacles to the public's need to know about "the operations of all forms of government" that these journalists have identified is the concept of privacy. Specifically, they say that the right of privacy should not prevent public disclosure of information that government gathers on private citizens. Of particular concern to these paladins of liberty is the suggestion that there should be limits on the public disclosure of arrest records. The Reporters Committee has been lobbying vigorously with Congress and the administrative agencies against such limits; its spokesman, Mr. Landau, is always publicly denouncing them, and the committee's journal reports assiduously on instances of the public being denied its right to know about some private citizen's arrest record.

Right now, the Reporters Committee is pressing a lawsuit in the Federal courts in Washington, D.C., to deal its enemy a fatal blow. The suit, known as *Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press* v. *U.S. Department of Justice* demands that the Federal Bureau of Investigation be compelled to turn over to all who ask "any records indicating any arrests, indictments, acquittals, convictions and sentences." Cheering from the sidelines are some of our leading newspapers, among them *The Los Angeles Times*, which proclaimed in an editorial on December 22, 1980, "Criminal-justice records, available for public inspection, are the great democratic safeguard against abuses in the criminal-justice system."

To make clear what the Reporters Committee wants, a few statistics are in order. There are a half-million or so law-enforcement officers in the United States, and they make more than ten million arrests annually. About 4 percent of these involve major crimes of violence or threats of violence—murder, manslaughter, rape, robbery, aggravated assault and arson. Burglary and simple assault account for another 8 percent. But the great bulk of arrests are for minor offenses, such as public drunkenness, disorderly conduct, possession of marijuana and (in the case of children) running away from home. About 40 percent of all adult arrests result in dismissal of charges or outright acquittals. About 90 percent of convictions are obtained through plea bargains. Some 50 percent of all American males are arrested at some time during their lives: 58 percent of all white urban males and 90 percent of all black urban males acquire arrest records. The F.B.I. currently keeps 172 million fingerprint cards on file. Its "criminal file" contains some seventy-eight million cards which, the Bureau says, represent approximately twenty-two million individuals. Studies show that between two-thirds and three-quarters of private employers turn down applicants for jobs if they discover that the person has an arrest record, even though there was no conviction. In other words, arrest records stigmatize, regardless of the seriousness of the offense and regardless of the ultimate disposition of the charges.

It is frequently argued that important considerations of public policy dictate public disclosure of arrest records. By knowing such records, it is said, we can protect ourselves against criminals. But those who make this argument, like most employers, do not distinguish (as the Reporters Committee does not distinguish) between arrest records and conviction records. So much for the presumption of innocence that is supposedly the foundation of our justice system. Nor does the Reporters Committee distinguish between serious crimes and trivial offenses. But even if the argument were restricted to conviction records involving serious crimes—at a guess, no more than 10 percent of the records the Reporters Committee wants to expose—it has an obvious flaw. It assumes that we would be more secure against crime if people with criminal records could not get jobs. But if a convicted robber who has served his sentence can't get a job, is the public any safer? It may make sense to permit employers to discover whether employees have been convicted of serious crimes directly relevant to their jobs. A bank would have a legitimate need to know if an applicant for a teller's job had been convicted of embezzlement; a school would not hire a janitor who had been convicted of child molestation. But how is public safety enhanced when the bank refuses to hire an applicant for teller because he molested a child or the school turns away an embezzler who wants a janitorial job? How much safer are we if a bridge builder refuses to hire an ironworker because he is a convicted child molester or a convicted embezzler?

Another argument in favor of forcing disclosure of arrest

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records is that it prevents secret arrests. But to expose such abuses, the press only needs access to very recent arrest records, and they have such access now. Police blotters are not secret, and arraignments of adults are open everywhere in the nation. The Reporters Committee's lawsuit, however, calls for the release of records of arrests that may have taken place thirty or forty years ago. In any case, the right of privacy is not an issue when a person is secretly jailed because the prisoner *wants* others to know about his imprisonment. It might be objected that in such cases the police would want to suppress the record whatever the arrested person's wishes. But police who will keep an arrest record secret when the arrested person wants it released would likewise be motivated to block journalists from obtaining it. As it happens, secret arrests were once a serious problem in some parts of the United States—in Chicago in the 1950s, for example—but at the time there were no legal barriers to the press's obtaining arrest records. Journalistic access is irrelevant to the problem of secret arrests, which is not a serious one today.

It is also argued (by *The Los Angeles Times*, among others), that public disclosure of arrest records is a "safeguard" against abuses in the criminal justice system. Yet this argument also only applies to contemporaneous records. The vast files maintained by the F.B.I. would not be the target of a lawsuit. The focus would be on a particular law-enforcement agency suspected of abuses. In much of the country, arrest-record files maintained by law-enforcement agencies are open; elsewhere they are closed. I know of no evidence that the openness of the files in some places produces fewer abuses than it does in places where the files are closed, or that anyone has used open files to expose abuses in the criminal-justice system.

But let us assume that opening arrest-record files will serve as a safeguard against abuses. Couldn't the same be said about opening the files of the Internal Revenue Service or the files of public hospitals? Wouldn't we discover irregularities in tax collection and in the provision of health care if the press and others had access to all those records? Yet the Reporters Committee does not advocate disclosing tax or medical records. Perhaps the journalists who steer this committee place a higher value on the secrecy of these records. Could it be because their own tax and medical histories are involved? But why is an arrest record less private than a tax record or a medical record? Why is *The Los Angeles Times* advocating the invasion of privacy to expose abuses in the criminal-justice system and not advocating the invasion of privacy to expose corruption in the tax system and the delivery of public health care?

Regardless of the public-policy considerations, there still remains the question of whether the First Amendment gives journalists and the general public the right to know about arrest records. In other circumstances in which public-policy considerations conflict with First Amendment rights, as in the distribution of violent pornography or of material promoting racial or religious prejudice, I would be among the first to insist that the First Amendment must prevail. Why not in this instance?

This is, of course, the central question. My answer is that I do not believe that the First Amendment requires the government to disclose information it has gathered about private citizens. Indeed, requiring such disclosure seems to be a subversion of the First Amendment.

The First Amendment protects, or ought to protect, the right of anyone to publish any information that intrudes on anyone else's privacy, whether an arrest record or anything else. I would allow no exception. This is analogous to my view that the First Amendment protects the right to publish violent pornography or information inciting racial or religious prejudice. No matter how offensive the material, it is simply intolerable to permit the government to decide what may be published and what may be suppressed. Each of us must be free to make such decisions. This is the essential meaning of the First Amendment. It empowers the citizen and it denies power to the government.

The situation is exactly opposite when the government collects information about us. Life in a mass society forces us to delegate to government the power to collect vast amounts of data about us so that it can act in matters affecting the health, safety and welfare of the whole. Lest government become too powerful, however, it is essential that we restrict the use it may make of this information. Ideally, it should be used only for the purposes for which it is collected, and destroyed when no longer needed for those purposes. The government holds a variegated dossier on each of us—on our health as revealed in our treatment in government-supported hospitals and by government-reimbursed doctors; on our finances as revealed in our tax records; on our behavior and misbehavior in school or in the armed services; on our marital relations and our relations with our children as revealed in our dealings with family courts; on our family circumstances as revealed in files on our government-insured mortgages, or on veterans' assistance, or aid to the poor; on our traffic violations, arrest records, conviction records, mental hospital records or nursing home records. If the government may disclose any or all of this information, it becomes omnipotent, and the individual is left exposed and thus vulnerable. To say that the First Amendment requires such a result is to stand it on its head.

I do not suggest the First Amendment protects only the right to publish. In the interest of empowering citizens to control their government, it must also protect the right to gather information. But as should be apparent to anyone who gives the matter a moment's thought, that right cannot be protected without qualification. Neither a journalist nor anyone else should be free to search the files of any doctor (as Nixon's "plumbers" searched the files of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist). Neither a journalist nor anyone else should be free to intrude in the bedroom of the President. Neither a journalist nor anyone else should be free to intrude in a jury room or in deliberations about a pending case by appellate judges. And so on.

The First Amendment protects, or ought to protect, the right to gather information about acts of the government.

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That is the information required by citizens to control the government. It is a right now under attack, for example, in proposals to shield the Central Intelligence Agency from the Freedom of Information Act. Defending that right is an urgent task for organizations like the Reporters Committee. Regrettably, however, in asserting a right to obtain information collected by the government on private citizens, the committee has taken the wrong course. By attacking the right to privacy, the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press attacks the values protected by the First Amendment. □

POOR VS. HEALTH-POOR

The Medicaid Class Struggle

TOBY COHEN

Thomas Schelling, professor of political economy at Harvard University, well expressed the current political *Zeitgeist* when he warned a group of prominent Democratic politicians, including Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Gov. Jerry Brown, at an election post-mortem dinner that "there are very sharp differences today between the interests and values of the poor and of organized labor, between Jews and other minorities. Consequently, we are going to have to define what collection of interests is going to prove viable for the Democratic Party in the 1980s."

Their defeat in the last election has given Democrats grounds for concern about the breakup of the old New Deal coalition, but Schelling seems to be advising his political colleagues to bid openly for middle-class votes by renouncing the social-welfare programs of Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Lyndon Johnson and John Kennedy. Schelling's reassessment may be decried as opportunistic, but actually he has obligingly exposed a dirty little secret of recent-vintage welfare liberalism—namely, that it has worked to create friction between the poor and the middle class.

This can be seen by examining one piece of contemporary liberal-Democratic legislation, Medicaid. Although an afterthought to the Medicare bill of 1965, Medicaid became the model for much social legislation in the past decade and a half, and signified a radical departure from New Deal democracy. Under Medicaid, medical benefits were not provided for all citizens; they were provided for the welfare poor and paid for by the working taxpayers. That is, instead of spreading benefits by restructuring the tax system, Medicaid redistributed wealth in the form of services—and did so in a way that favored one class over another.

All the talk about "Medicaid mills" aside, a Medicaid card will today buy care at the clinics of our leading hospitals that is every bit as good as a middle-class person can buy from a private physician or have paid for by private medical insurance. Middle-class patients can, of course, receive treatment at these same clinics. The hitch is that lacking a Medicaid card, and lacking (as 40 percent of the work force does) comprehensive major medical insurance [see Geraldine Alpert and Marsha Hurst, "A Plague on Our Hospitals," *The Nation*, June 14, 1980], and lacking the often prohibitive fees for office visits to a private physician, an otherwise comfortably off middle-class person now finds hospital-clinic charges prohibitive. Free to the poor—thanks to him and other taxpayers—the clinics are beyond his own means.

At Mount Sinai Hospital in New York City, for example, a single person grossing $10,000 a year pays $55 per clinic visit, whether he has to use the clinic once a year, once a month, once a week, or once a day, and regardless of his other expenses. Now, the Department of Welfare of the City of New York allows $200 a month for rent for a single person. Since our man is making $10,000, let's assume he doesn't live in a welfare neighborhood and thus pays, say, $300 a month (still low in New York City), or $3,600 a year. For electricity he pays about $500 a year; for telephone service about $220; with $2,350 for food (no steaks or fish for him); $200 for soap, toothpaste and the like; $620 for carfare. Thus, for bare necessities he pays $7,490 a year. Yet after taxes he takes home only $7,600. That leaves him $110. And we have not budgeted anything for movies, haircuts, clothing, magazines or newspapers. If he requires medical care beyond two clinic visits a year, he cannot pay for it—and almost certainly he cannot pay for the two. Yet his taxes support Medicaid.

Of the entire population using the clinics at Mount Sinai 33 percent pay the fees themselves. But none of the fees charged by Mount Sinai (see chart) have any more to do with need for care or ability to pay than does the fee our man

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The Mount Sinai Hospital Self-Pay Sliding Fee Schedule for Clinic Care*

Effective January 1, 1980

Fees Charged	$10	$18	$25	$35	$45	$55	$55 +
Gross Yearly Income	$3,400-$3,999	$4,000-$4,599	$4,600-$5,899	$5,900-$7,399	$7,400-$9,999	$10,000-$19,999	$20,000 +

* These are the figures for a family of one; as the family size increases the fee paid decreases for the same gross yearly income; no other expenditures are considered, however. This fee schedule is representative of all New York City hospital fee schedules for clinic care.

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grossing $10,000 a year pays. He knows that when the politicians talk about the poor they mean somebody else. Yet why should he be required to help pay for someone else's free care when his own charges are too high?

Obviously, of all the people who voted for Ronald Reagan because they wanted "government off their backs," because they no longer wanted to fund social programs out of their paychecks, few came into direct competition for services with people on welfare who were receiving these services free. And few had to choose *not* to buy medical care for their children while they watched their tax dollars pay for some other child's health care. But wasn't there a general perception from the lower-middle class on up that the tax dollar was buying services only for the nontaxpayer—was in fact making the nontaxpayer better off than the taxpayer?

In his Presidential campaign eight years ago, George McGovern dramatized the case for poor blacks by displaying on television an extremely articulate, well-nourished welfare mother named Beulah Sanders, who talked about her nine children's right to a higher education financed by the taxpayers. Many viewers sat there wondering where they were going to get the money to send their children to college.

Clearly, McGovern and all the other liberal Democratic legislators didn't intend to create resentment among those footing the bill for Medicaid and the other Great Society legislation. But surely they knew that the classes were already divided by racial prejudices and fears. Was it simple naïveté that prompted legislation pitting poor against middle class, instead of uniting them against the rich? Was it simply an inability to *add*? Or were the legislators co-opted by the wealthy power blocs, whether the American Hospital Association, with its powerful lobby, or the real estate lobby, or the even more impressively financed oil industries?

Recently, Ray Cornbill, spokesman for Samuel Davis, the head of Mount Sinai and the Association of Major Teaching Hospitals, remarked forthrightly that Mount Sinai suggests to all patients who cannot afford to pay clinic fees that they apply for welfare so as to get a Medicaid card. "That's what every hospital does," he said. "We're no different. What do you want us to do, give free care? We can't afford to do that. Yes, we prefer Medicaid patients. We get more money that way, to run our hospital, and the patient gets medical care. . . . I see nothing harmful to the patient to suggest he give up his job temporarily and apply for welfare. The equity of it is not our problem. That's society's problem." And so the American Hospital Association spends its time lobbying for more Medicaid benefits for the welfare poor and against extending those benefits to the middle class—in other words, national health insurance—because that would bring additional government regulation of their practice.

Why, then, are we surprised that the old Democratic coalition fell apart? Surely in a sense Professor Schelling is right. How can we expect labor and the poor to feel they have anything in common when our Democratic President told labor—which had lobbied for the last twenty years for national health insurance—that we can only afford national health insurance for the welfare poor, with the wage-earning laborer paying the bill. Franklin Roosevelt dreamed of a society built on freedom from want and freedom from fear. In practice the blacks were excluded, until the visionaries of the 1960s set out to create a color-blind society. But the liberal Democrats passed legislation that institutionalized both class and color lines by providing separate services—medical, legal, etc., for different economic classes.

How can the Democratic Party now convince the poor and the middle class, those on welfare and those who work, the Jew and the black, that they are not each other's enemies; that their best interests lie in uniting against a tax structure that protects the wealthy power blocs?

In another sense, Professor Schelling is wrong. The question confronting the Democratic Party is not what are the new interests of the middle class. The question is whether the Democrats want to compete with the Republicans to see who can best protect the interests of the well off, or whether they want to educate the poor and the middle class, the minority groups, the working and the nonworking about their common interests and to their common betterment. □

THE EXPORTABLE DREAM

America Was Promises (Still)

EDWARD HOAGLAND

What we have is a changed world, and in America we have lost our way. It seems as though we lose our way when we lose our generosity; or perhaps more accurately, a loss of generosity has marked past occasions when we have lost our way. The great surges of immigration here, when enormous clusters of strangers were able to carve out new lives for themselves with a minimum of hazing from those who had arrived earlier on the scene, coincided, quite naturally, with periods when our economy was booming and we had a sense of Manifest Destiny. We knew then that we were a continental-sized, elastic, supranational society, and although our hospitality seldom extended to blacks or Chinese or American Indians, we were proud we had space and surplus work and tolerance enough to accommodate even nationalities we couldn't think up a polite name for.

Generally, however, we were so self-absorbed we had no foreign policy—or else a very simple one, like the Monroe Doctrine. In fact, we found it hard to understand any foreigners who didn't choose to cross the seas and join us. To this day, we are continually puzzling out the circumstance that other countries are likely to maintain their own

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customs, forms of government and manner of regarding the world. After the eighteenth century, we were not much in favor of revolutions; and when a burst of large-heartedness did occur in us with respect to foreign affairs, a special, visionary figure—a Woodrow Wilson, a Franklin Roosevelt, a George Catlett Marshall—was the catalyst. Also, we didn't want to be just conventionally useful. Some obvious triumph of the American way should be demonstrated, like Nisei eavesdropping on the Japanese infantry during the Pacific campaign, or Hungarian-Americans, Norwegian-Americans, Italian-Americans parachuting behind the lines to aid the anti-Nazi partisans. Most awesome was our assembly-line production of corn and wheat and tanks and planes.

The landslide swing in the election last fall came with the country slipping its gears but still cherishing and trying to coast along on its established identity. That is, we had our system of managed capitalism which we believed made for maximum business efficiency combined with softened consequences for the laborer, the little guy and even the lame duck. Our profit motive had created what we supposed to be an all-conquering capacity to mass-produce everything from flivvers to zippers and, equally significantly, had plowed the field for the inventive talents who by the many thousands had poured across the Atlantic to our side of the earth, patenting the very future as our own.

We were a free society, boasting both a "melting pot" that could receive practically anybody from anywhere and turn him into an American, and what has been described as "cultural pluralism," affording each group a continuing ethnic separateness or snobbery, if it chose. Our press was freer than Britain's, as we told ourselves, and our written Constitution provided us with uniquely resilient institutions. We prided ourselves on knowing no foreign languages, because it was the business of the world to come to us for instruction and salvation and therefore to learn ours. (Even now, according to U.S. Department of Commerce estimates, only 8 to 10 percent of some 300,000 U.S. manufacturing concerns engage in any exporting, and merchandise exports represent 8½ percent of the gross national product.)

But besides homogenizing foreigners as they arrived, yet furnishing them an annual solidarity day to march up Fifth Avenue, we were a nation of independent-minded souls. Individualism had been the keystone of frontier character, because only a sort of rampant eccentricity could fuel the strange and lonely feats of endurance that cracked the solitude of the wilderness. Afterward, in the Mountain West, sheer geographical scope forced a continued cussedness upon the isolated population. In New England and the South, as well, idiosyncrasy or eccentricity were lifetime investments. Southerners valued it especially in their gentry and their generals, New Englanders in their artisans and farmers. Every hilltop, every valley in New England lay in a separate township with its own gossip, general store and board of selectmen. Down South, on the other hand, where the climate, although lush, was just as arduous, slavery had engendered within plenty of white men the personality of a potentate. And parts of California were blessed with a climate so benign that life and money-making came easy, leaving room for endless social experimentation. Long beaches on an ocean of majestic sweep and mystery seemed to call into question every traditional verity.

So America set much value upon individuality at the same time as it homogenized its immigrants. And though it was a paradigm of generosity among nations to refugees, free spirits, roughnecks, hustlers, fumblers and the average run of poor sods from north Europe and the Mediterranean littoral, they had best expect to find themselves tossed in the blanket for several years in a kind of initiation ceremony. But nobody objected unduly to this. What could be more natural in a new continent where earlier immigrants, for a lengthier, tougher period than anybody's grimy sojourn on the Lower East Side, had had to rip up thousands of miles of trees? We were a society uncorrupted by secret police, military police, standardized bribery. In Athens, Dusseldorf, Palermo, in Dublin, Warsaw and Alexandria, anybody knew that if only he could finagle a visa, catch a



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ship and reach these shores, he too would be absorbed. America wasn't only a golden land where Americans got rich; anybody was eligible. In Portugal, Greece or Poland, when Americans ventured abroad, hospitality was offered in response. People were friendly to Americans. .

Nevertheless, there did remain that problem of insularity. Our internal markets for our products had stopped growing so fast. Belatedly, in Latin America and later in Southeast Asia we had become a bullying imperial power ourselves, meanwhile continuing to be the only nation that has not hesitated to employ radioactive weapons with the express purpose of killing at a stroke hundreds of thousands of civilians. Our Statue of Liberty held out its torch principally to refugees from our political enemies, rather than an impartial assortment. Yet our emphasis upon the nuts and bolts of democracy became so literal-minded at home that candidates for President needed to run for years for the office, to the exclusion of all other activities.

With prosperity, such a splintering of interests had occurred that Americans experienced the luxury of turning their backs upon the notion of a common good. Instead, it was "I'm all right, Jack." Inevitably, the snobbery of early groups, such as the English, by dictating that later arrivals repudiate their memories of the Old Country and blend into an Anglo culture too hastily, encouraged contemporary ethnic snobbery. But America was deemed to be so irresistibly influential that various constituencies could frankly put the interests of other countries ahead of U.S. interests. Greeks could advocate punishing Turkey for its quarrels with Greece, at the expense of America's defense alliance with Turkey. Jews could urge that Arabs be punished for quarreling with Israel's territorial ambitions at tremendous cost to the American economy. A number of bellwether intellectuals claimed we weren't a "melting pot" at all, and shouldn't be. Yet so decided a majority of Americans had been leveled into the middle class that most people acted as if they could no longer imagine that they or any right-thinking ancestor of theirs ever might have lived below the poverty line. Sweden, a country of eight million folk (not known for being so generous forty years ago), was contributing more to UNICEF than the U.S.'s 220 million.

But apart from a supranational empathy or generosity, what we had treasured in ourselves and considered we were known for—bedazzling industrial achievements because of mass production, and yet a democracy of merit—not so many of us believed in now. Nobody wanted to stand in an assembly line, and seniority had become the yardstick of advancement in the labor movement, the civil service and a good many corporations. Our economy had contracted arteriosclerosis, and though a cult of youth did still reign in matters of popular culture, its props were not traditional: neither patriotism nor hard work, not much personal loyalty, nor the radicalism of youth.

In literature, the vogue among intellectuals has shifted to the new writing coming out of Eastern Europe, and properly so. Individuals such as Danilo Kis and Milan Kundera convey the starkest sort of claustrophobia, surpassing in its realism all the more familiar modern pessimists, like Kafka or George Orwell, who by comparison seem to have been only speculating on the future or else interpreting the present neurasthenically. We have begun to believe, in other words, that what they have to say might come to apply directly to us. Also, we are quite taken with Latin American authors, who had a virgin continent to start with, but bleaker events than ours to chronicle, and who are both like and unlike our own masters.

There was of course some ambiguity to Fenimore Cooper, to the Transcendentalists and Walt Whitman, and a more ominous component in Hawthorne, Melville, Twain or Faulkner. But the bets were never really down. Injun Territory still existed to flee to—the way Sam Houston, then Governor of Tennessee, ran away to live with the Cherokees after his marriage failed. The gloom of Hawthorne or Faulkner had specific regional sources, in regions that have swiftly changed. And they, too, recognized that an open road remained. From Cooper to the likes of Kerouac, ours was a literature that opened outward. Having thrown off one king, we knew that we would never have another. If good was battling evil, it was not, for good, always a rearguard action, and the more usual signature of American literature was explosive, openhearted exuberance.

But, seized now by a sense that the fun is over, we are moving with trepidation to examine the totalitarian experience. Economists are pessimistic. Political scientists are pessimistic about democracy's survival in the world at large. Ecologists forecast the destruction of half a million species of plants and animals—one-fifth of Creation—within the next twenty years. And while a great many American conservatives are exhilarated at having thrown the rascals out of Washington, there is no feeling of sure confidence among them. The moderate and internationalist right is jostled uneasily by a New Right that is new to most Republicans. The so-called Neoconservatives, whose leadership consists mainly of Jewish intellectuals, finds itself "allied" with a Moral Majority with an ugly, back-burner potential for active anti-Semitism. For different reasons, therefore, many of these people have a feeling that they are playing with fire; after old scores with the left have been settled, and maybe some quick money made, they wonder where they'll be. A Franklin Roosevelt could amalgamate gut enemies into a trustworthy alliance because his heart was with the underdog. But what will Ronald Reagan do if, let's say, the Sun Belt Moral Majority turns on the New York Neoconservatives with the intention of devouring them alive?

Our failures in foreign policy have resulted from our failure to apply our ideals beyond our own borders, it seems to me. Democracy, generosity, tolerance, pragmatism, spontaneity, a concern for the weak and poor, openness to change. I don't mean that these root qualities of what used to appeal to the rest of the world about America would, all alone, face down the Russians. I would like to see a stronger U.S. Army and Navy. I would like to see our Third World allies armed sufficiently to defend themselves. I would like to see American free enterprise re-gear itself imaginatively

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to compete with the Japanese by figuring out what products the rest of the globe needs. I would like to see America reassert the primacy of its idea that securing the vigor and liberty of single souls is the purpose of good government. This idea, in our heyday, mesmerized the whole Western world, and it remains revolutionary partly because we have never preached or invested in it beyond our shores. No rival concept will ever be able to prevail over it without the force of a gun. □

GHETTO ENTERPRISE ZONES

A Walk on the Supply Side

STANLEY ARONOWITZ AND CARY GOODMAN

Since the great urban renewal surge of the 1960s all we have been doing is bulldozing great holes in our cities and throwing billions of Federal dollars down them. Little has resulted. Little has changed. We need a bold new approach.
—Senator John Chaffee

Senator Chaffee's comments express the major conservative indictment of liberal Democratic urban policy. Now, the Heritage Foundation, a Washington-based conservative research organization that provided much of Ronald Reagan's early domestic policy, has come up with a study that contains a "bold new approach" for the 1980s. The study, which was written by Stuart Butler, a staff researcher, is the basis of a bill that will be introduced in the 97th Congress by Representatives Jack Kemp and Robert Garcia. It calls for a sharp break with traditional Democratic strategies for dealing with urban poverty and inner-city decay.

Instead of attacking unemployment through Federal programs like CETA (Comprehensive Education and Training Act) or work-fare schemes that encourage or coerce welfare recipients to perform public service jobs, the bill stresses job creation almost exclusively through the private sector. Under the Kemp-Garcia-Heritage approach, jobs would be provided by "creating a more attractive commercial climate for entrepreneurs in the inner cities by dramatic reductions in business-related taxes." Under the plan, the Secretary of Commerce would be empowered to authorize cities and towns to set aside certain areas as Enterprise Jobs Zones. Once these zones are designated, the Heritage report advocates that zoning and similar planning regulations be "drastically simplified" (i.e., relaxed) to allow commercial development of land where such usage has been restricted. The higher the percentage of local residents a firm employs, the more business and property taxes would be reduced. To qualify for the full tax break, a business must draw at least 25 percent of its employees from the local labor force. In addition, the Heritage report calls for the suspension of Social Security taxes and easing of the minimum wage law in order to encourage the hiring of young people.

The Kemp-Garcia bill does not reflect all of the Heritage proposals because some of them can only be implemented under state and local authority and others are still viewed as political dynamite. But their broad outlines are embodied in the legislation. Further, in the final version of the bill, some of the more controversial provisions such as Social Security tax exemptions in the zones may be modified or deleted. Nonetheless, the bill will be the centerpiece of the new Administration's effort to apply supply-side economics to social problems and an update of the hoary proposition that what is good for business is good for the country.

As Butler admits, the ideas included in the new conservative urban policy are borrowed from Britain, where Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's Government has made Enterprise Zones the keystone of its urban- and economic-development strategy. But there is another inspiration: Operation Bootstrap, which has shaped the economic policies of various Puerto Rican Governments since 1940. The record of Operation Bootstrap is instructive in assessing the Enterprise Jobs Zones program's chances for success. In the past forty years, literally thousands of plants streamed from the mainland United States to Puerto Rico because of incentives similar to those recommended by the Heritage Foundation. Undergarment plants, toy manufacturers and other low-wage industries found Puerto Rico an attractive alternative to relatively high-wage, unionized areas of the industrial Northeast of the United States. However, only a few companies that employ highly skilled labor—for example, the now defunct Commonwealth Oil Refining Company and Union Carbide—moved to Puerto Rico. Despite significant efforts by Fomento, the government agency set up to attract industry, Puerto Rico became a haven for low-wage, low-technology and economically marginal businesses, or extractive industries such as oil. Today there are few medium- or high-technology plants on the island. What is more, Operation Bootstrap never succeeded in reducing joblessness to mainland levels. The unemployment rate on the island remains high, and without the large emigration to New York and other U.S. cities, it would be even higher. Even though Puerto Rico has no minimum-wage laws, and lavishes tax holidays (accelerated depreciation allowances, capital-gains benefits and so forth) on companies willing to invest, most Puerto Rican workers are still employed in low-wage tourism or other service industries. And because Puerto Rico is tied intimately to the U.S. economy, the 1973-74 recession on the mainland resulted in the closing of many of the plants that had opened during the boom years after World War II, leaving thousands stranded with no alternative except to emigrate.

The South Bronx will serve as the prototype area for the Kemp-Garcia-Heritage approach. Plagued by a wave of fires over the past five years, the South Bronx is among the most ravaged urban neighborhoods in the United States.

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More than 30 percent of its residents are on some form of welfare and its rate of unemployment is twice that of the city as a whole. Congressman Garcia represents this area, where 50,000 housing units have been lost, mostly to arson, since 1970. According to recent census figures, more than 200,000 residents moved away during this period, many of them made homeless by fires. Garcia's co-sponsorship of the measure represents a last-ditch effort to save the remaining half-million people in his district who are trying to survive amid the rubble, although Kemp-Garcia would apply to other "bombed-out" neighborhoods, such as Los Angeles' Watts section and Chicago's West Side, as well. But does this "bold new approach" offer any real hope to the people living in these areas?

First, the bill's intention is to bring the private sector into the center cities by offering investment incentives. As planner Robert Goodman reminds us, such inducements have been a staple of local economic development policy since the end of World War II, largely among Southern and rural communities, which enticed industry to leave heavily taxed Northern cities and settle in the cotton fields of south Georgia and other erstwhile agrarian states. The objective of the Kemp-Garcia bill is to reverse the tide by making inner cities at least as attractive as rural Alabama. Goodman, who calls the development corporations that sponsored the earlier migration the "last entrepreneurs," argues that cities and counties are already locked in mortal combat for footloose companies looking for greener pastures. The Kemp-Garcia approach would simply add the South Bronx to the bidding game for industry, competing against places like Arkansas, Puerto Rico and Detroit for peripatetic sweatshops.

Second, Enterprise Jobs Zones would encounter competition from foreign countries like Malaysia, Taiwan and Korea, which have already lured away many light industries from the United States. It is hard to envisage incentives sufficiently generous to prevent capital from fleeing to those low-wage nations. Many businesses now overseas went there after a stopover in Mississippi, to which they had fled from New York City's garment district a decade or so earlier.

But what of high-technology plants or businesses engaged in research and development activities, which seem the most likely to move to the center cities? Drawn by the cultural amenities of the large cities, the scientists and engineers working for these firms would quite possibly prefer to live in New York or Boston rather than a rural slum. Yet, employment for these professionals is not the ostensible legislative objective of the bold new approach—it is jobs for the poor. If chemical research labs or electronics plants locate in the South Bronx, they could meet the criteria for the tax incentives offered by Kemp-Garcia by employing local residents as custodians, unskilled assemblers, lab assistants and clerical workers. But the legislation does not provide for training the unemployed in new skills or remedying their high illiteracy rate so that they can qualify for technical jobs. Supply-side economics holds that there is no such thing as "structural" unemployment, that is, unemployment that is not alleviated by economic growth. Thus, under the Reagan urban policy a number of new facilities may indeed sprout in the rubble of the South Bronx and other devastated areas, but few local residents will gain more than a low-paying, entry-level job.

Companies that would move to San Francisco or New York because they are seeking a skilled labor force will not need the kind of incentives envisioned in the Kemp-Garcia bill. For these companies, the various tax breaks in the bill would be little more than a giveaway. The few companies in highly competitive industries that might be swayed by its provisions offer only temporary relief to the economic plight of the center cities because most workers in the garment trade and other such light industries are not paid enough to live on, and therefore qualify for public assistance of one kind or another. The Kemp-Garcia bill is not really an alternative to welfare; it is its extension.

The trouble is that the Kemp-Garcia bill is explicitly linked to the abolition of programs that make government the employer of last resort. If, as we have suggested, the Enterprise Jobs Zones do not eliminate unemployment, the jobless will turn to welfare. Furthermore, the tax concessions that hard-pressed municipalities must make to attract industries will exacerbate their fiscal problems and result in further cutbacks in public services like schools, housing and sanitation.

Of course, the bill's supporters hold out the hope that the economy will expand and the new Federal tax guidelines will persuade the private sector to choose the South Bronx or Roxbury, Massachusetts, over the Sun Belt. But if the present economic cycle of stagnation and inflation continues, the bill will fail to alleviate the woes of our cities. Such few gains as will here and there occur will represent a temporary rearrangement of the preferred areas of industrial location, a game of musical chairs with the cities and counties frantically competing and industry calling the tune. Meanwhile, millions will remain out of work or be condemned to low-paying dead-end jobs. □

Liberalism

(Continued From Front Cover)

However, it is just as possible that Republican candidates and positions will continue to command majority support among voters (that is, the minority of those eligible to vote who do vote) for the foreseeable future. Thus, opposition to Reagan is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the political defeat of the new conservative coalition. Indeed, the conditions of economic stagnation, declining international strength and social anxiety are good breeding grounds for selfishness, resentment, paranoia and other motivations to Republicanism. The inner madness of the conservatives is well packaged as tax cuts, less bureaucracy, more strength in the world. The hold of the past on the subconscious of the living is often more powerful than the shimmering vagueness of the future, especially if the future is repeatedly de-

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fined as a fall from security and greatness. And when the Republican message can be delivered seductively and repeatedly by exceedingly well-financed Political Action Committees (PACs), direct-mail operations and media campaigns, its staying power becomes inestimable.

Most of all, the future of Republican power is dependent on the apparent and growing weaknesses of the opposition. The socialist left has rarely been a serious electoral alternative in America. But for most of this century, and especially since the New Deal, there has been a liberal, more or less social-democratic coalition with substantial political power. It was this liberalism of the Democratic Party, the New Deal, the Great Society, the Americans for Democratic Action, the A.F.L.-C.I.O. and the American Civil Liberties Union that finally fell before Reagan's conservative army. As I recently argued in *The Wall Street Journal*, only the sweeping away of outmoded viewpoints and the sinking of a new doctrinal foundation will bring the Democratic Party back to power in the 1980s.

Here are some of the views that have been cobwebbed by time:

§ Motivated by the "world government" promise of the United Nations, liberalism became reluctant to wave the flag too righteously and allowed the fundamental issue of patriotic nationalism to be controlled by the conservatives.

§ Then, appalled at the "backward" Bible-thumping fundamentalists, the liberals began losing the issue of religion to the right wing. Liberalism instead became a secularized coalition of pro-abortion Catholics, moderate Protestants, Reform Jews, Unitarians and atheists and, lately, Zen Buddhists and plain meditators.

§ Shocked by the Vietnam War and nuclear insanity, the liberals became critics of military spending per se, without a coherent military doctrine of their own, losing the issue of national security to the likes of Richard Nixon.

§ Raised on the Roosevelt tradition, liberals believed that an expansion of the public sector was the answer to every ill of society. The liberals barely noticed that the unemployed of the 1930s who supported Roosevelt had become the squeezed suburban taxpayers of the 1970s who supported Howard Jarvis.

§ Faced with a rising wave of crime and violence, but eschewing J. Edgar Hoover's "law and order" and that of the Chicago police, many liberals acted like social psychologists as people were victimized. They seemed to counsel the citizen being stabbed to remain patient until the Humphrey-Hawkins bill passed. The conservatives began to recruit liberals who had been mugged.

§ Reacting to the rigid disciplinary mores of the past, liberals adopted permissiveness (or "doing your own thing") as a new concept of freedom. The conservatives were busily blaming the collapse of education in the schools and productivity in the factories on Dr. Spock.

Having thus lost God, the flag, national defense, tax relief, personal safety and traditional family values to the conservatives, it became more than a little difficult for these liberals to explain why they should be entrusted with the authority to govern.

There remained one very basic issue which liberal Democrats could rely on for their political strength until this election: the economy. But in 1980, a conservative Republican has taken the pocketbook issue away from the Democratic liberals, perhaps for a long time.

The Democrats are not likely to make a comeback in 1984 by either mimicking Republican policies (as Carter did) or recycling the New Deal (as Senator Kennedy proposed). A return to either Herbert Hoover or Franklin Roosevelt will fail. We cannot recover our economic strength by dismantling government and returning to free enterprise. Nor can we recover by overtaxing the declining incomes of working

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people to pay for stopgap social programs that don't work.

America needs a revitalization program as new and far-reaching as the New Deal was in its time. There must be a new social contract drawn between government, business, labor, minorities and the general voting public. Some of the cornerstones of this new order would be:

(*1*) Energy conservation as a higher priority than the mad scramble for synthetic fuels and nuclear power plants. Saving energy means saving money, saving jobs and perhaps saving America from an ignoble war in the Middle East.

(*2*) An industrial recovery plan to deal with neglected sectors at home and the invasion of competition from abroad. If basic industries like autos want government bail-outs, they should in return be producing mass transit equipment as well as fuel-efficient cars running on gasohol from the Middle West instead of oil from the Middle East.

(*3*) An anti-inflation policy applying the idea of "living within our means" not only to wasteful government spending but to conserving expensive fossil fuels, making transit systems and appliances more efficient, breaking the concentrated power of private monopolies over necessities like food and medicine and requiring that investment decisions include consideration of the "inflation impact" (just as environmental impact statements are required).

(*4*) An innovation policy: a planned and urgent government-investment strategy directed toward renewable resources like solar energy and cutting-edge technologies like electronics.

(*5*) An enlightened use of pension funds as a precious source of capital. With government spending limits and corporate capital shortages, pension funds will be looked at more closely than ever. The workers involved will want a new voice in the decisions about how their deferred earnings are invested.

(*6*) A tax system which asks the corporate rich to pay their fair share for the sake of social stability as well as justice, and which provides incentives for labor-intensive, non-polluting investment decisions.

(*7*) A new partnership in making economic decisions among corporations, labor, government and public-interest groups. Planning from the top down, or simply in the narrow interest of the corporations, will fail without the involved consent of labor and the public.

(*8*) If government regulation is to be reduced, greater corporate accountability will become a necessity, including placement of employees and consumers on corporate boards. The need for burdensome government programs will only decline as rapidly as the business sector ceases the poisoning of the workplace and environment, ends the output of unsafe and shoddy products, stops promoting the mass consumption of unhealthy foods, humanizes the office to reduce stress and finds ways to employ ten million out-of-work Americans.

(*9*) A concept of a Spartan national security will have to evolve. Bigger military budgets have not brought greater security. The government, for example, has no workable policies directed at hostage-taking or terrorism, or nuclear proliferation. Nor does it explain why America's military strength defends Western Europe and Japan against Soviet tanks and missiles while permitting a deadly invasion of German and Japanese cars and television sets here at home. Nor does it explain how we can be secure as a tiny fortress of gluttony preparing for nuclear war with the Russians while 500 million people are starving to death around the world. Nor why Russian military strength is bogged down in Afghanistan and frustrated by nonviolent strikers in Poland.

(*10*) Overcoming economic discrimination—particularly in incomes—of women and minorities as a way to improve productivity and decrease social discrimination. There should be income incentives for all comparable to those available to white males.

(*11*) An electronic communications-information system which binds the American people and the world's people in a new, decentralized grid of education, cultural awareness and political involvement.

(*12*) We will have to clean up and improve the quality of life at home in order to build public confidence for the future and willingness to sacrifice to get there. Health care decays, schools disintegrate, products deteriorate and slums stagnate while we spend more on pornography than the arts, more on pets than school lunches, and while television numbs the minds of our children. These outrages cannot be defended any longer by doctrines of permissiveness and consumer freedom, or by knowing shrugs of inevitability.

We need more than ever a participatory society in which persons of all life styles believe that they matter, instead of the escapist culture that absorbs millions in irrelevance. We cannot contend with the coming of external limits unless we delve more into our rich inner potentials.

It comes down to moving from a wasteful, privately oriented, self-indulgent existence to a more conserving, caring and disciplined life style. The cornerstone has to be a renewal of self-reliance, not the outmoded frontier fantasy of the Republican philosophers, but the reassertion of personal responsibility in everything from conserving resources to decentralizing services to keeping ourselves well through self-care to practicing a "right livelihood" in business. It is a change from planned obsolescence to the production of useful goods that last, from consumer madness to the achievement of inner satisfactions, from the opulence of Jay Gatsby to the frugal self-assurance of Henry David Thoreau.

More important than money and technique in elections is the factor of motivation and vision. The Democrats (or someone else) will return to national leadership when they are inspired again.

The search for power has been a more ambiguous project for the left-of-center than for the right in America, as readers of *The Nation* well know. Not only is "success" a loaded notion morally but it has been harder to achieve from the left. A sometimes comfortable, sometimes painful isolation from power has been the status of the reformers for generations. American history has been full of radical upheavals but very rarely have they been channeled into ef-

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fective political parties in which individuals and groups struggled for real power.

Somehow, however, this must be the project of the 1980s. Protest, even rebellion, against the Republican dynasty will not be enough to offset disaster. There must be a connection of vision and pragmatism, clear solutions and organized coalitions, based on the belief that political power is necessary, not for ego but for survival and for laying the foundation of a better society.

If that belief takes hold among enough people outraged by the Republican doctrines, the rest is a matter of hard work. America is at a turning point, in which a right-wing Republican ascendancy can take hold for a decade or longer, or in which a new governing coalition based on a new consensus, influenced but not controlled by the left, will prevail. Inaction by the left will almost guarantee the prolonged triumph of the new conservatives. But with a commitment, a plan of action is possible along these lines:

A new political coalition: A new vision is nothing unless it flows from, and connects to, the needs of a potential majority force. The old Democratic New Deal coalition is fragmented, weakened, not large enough to be an electoral majority again. In the view of political analyst Sam Hurst, "The revitalization of the Democratic coalition must consider the potential political punch of *new* constituencies in addition to increasing the performances of traditional constituencies." He cites as examples the forty-four million American working women, the fifty million young people who don't vote, the thirty-six million physically disabled, vision- or hearing-impaired Americans, and the millions of "permanent renters." Without defining the coalition more carefully, the point is that a successful progressive movement must represent the gut self-interests of several mass constituencies, woven together both by single-issue campaigns (e.g., renters' rights, stopping toxic dumping, fair housing for children, nondiscrimination against gays) and by the common need for political representation and power.

Identifying "progressive" economic sectors: It is insane to oppose all forms of private property or capitalism and expect to have a significant voice in America. First of all, there is nothing wrong with certain kinds of private ownership and entrepreneurialism, and second, reform becomes impossible if the reformer unites the whole business system and a majority of voters against the reform proposals. A coalition has to include the interests of smaller businesses and farmers, innovators in solar energy and conservation, communication and electronics; and must go further to distinguish those sectors which are relatively benign toward communities, the environment and developing countries (e.g., computers) from those which are the most destructive (e.g., chemicals). In the housing industry, for example, the builders (for all their faults) have an objectively greater interest in affordable housing, including government-sponsored housing, than large landlords and speculators who deal in cash flows. A progressive movement has to have one leg based in the economic real world.

Handling divisive issues with care: Progressive Democrats must remain faithful to the expressed needs of women, minorities, labor, those who suffer unfair treatment and second-class status. But if the particular interests and demands of each constituent group are unilaterally pressed as matters of absolute priority, no coalition can hold together. All such interests should be constantly reexamined as to their merits (busing, for example, is questionable from a left as well as a right perspective), and where the merit remains clear but still divisive to the coalition, there must be a process for determining where really to draw the lines on principle (the Equal Rights Amendment, for example) and where to find an alternative approach that keeps the coalition as well as the issue alive. There is always the danger, of course, that the majoritarian approach will dull and subordinate certain "unpopular" issues to a point where their partisans feel betrayed. Certainly few movements have become legitimate without fighting for their cause and passing through a phase of scorn, attack and social rejection. Where this appears necessary to raise a certain issue, the only answer may be a "dual strategy": forming a single-issue, independent and aggressive movement on



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the outside, which raises the same issue to the extent possible on the inside without wrecking the broader coalition.

Solving the problems of voter registration and fund raising: If all those eligible to vote in 1980 had gone to the polls, Ronald Reagan would not be President of the United States. Of the generation which has come of voting age since 1960, only twenty-five million out of seventy-five million have even registered to vote. The reasons for this lie in (*a*) voter alienation from parties that are not accountable (renters in Santa Monica have voted in 25 percent greater numbers since rent control was passed in 1978), (*b*) difficulties imposed by the voting laws (voting on a single weekday, greater burdens on the poor, the elderly, the sick, renters and students, whose residences change) and (*c*) the rise of the three television networks as a vicarious substitute for the two parties (action news, consumer reports, call-in shows). A major emphasis has to be placed on party accountability, simplifying registration and voting, and turning the electronic media into an environment of alternative information and citizen feedback to government.

"Party accountability" has been colored with many meanings. However, there have been two identifiable and polarized trends in the Democratic Party in recent years which have to be reconciled somehow. In the 1960s, it was the party of "the Establishment" (elected officials, power brokers). Then, after its shattering in 1968, it became much more of a "grass-roots" party (with quotas, local activists, etc.). The problem today is that it is neither. Elected Democratic officials have to be brought back into the party structure, with voting power at conventions (while still reserving a portion of delegate seats for grass-roots activists chosen at caucuses). In exchange for this renewal of their influence within the party, however, they should be accountable to a platform process that is as inclusive and grass-roots in nature as possible. Adherence to platform should be made more obligatory than at present, though not absolutely binding. Majority and minority views in the party should be not only tolerated but given some sort of structural expression. For example, majority-view Democrats could be rewarded with top committee assignments in legislative bodies, but minority-view advocates given a role as well in the areas of their concern, just as the two national parties currently have "majority" and "minority" designations in legislative committees. Another alternative would be to deny party financial support for candidates who refuse to support the Equal Rights Amendment; they could thus run, and possibly win office as Democrats, but at least there would be a tangible sanction imposed for their departure from party principle.

The other major obstacle to progressive success is the lack of a fund-raising base comparable to the convenient corporate ability to raise millions of dollars and, in effect, pass the costs on to consumers. Certainly, there are reforms in order, and they will be on the agenda increasingly as the situation grows worse (preventing independent PACs, limiting corporate contributions, ceilings on spending, public financing). But the problem is more than an inherent advantage for corporations over the individual. Any good cause should be able to prevail even if outspent two to one. The problem is one of money *mis*-spent (millions of liberal dollars to John Anderson), and money not even tapped (if all members of the labor movement believed in their unions and gave only $10 to politics per year, the labor "war chest" would be $200 million; if the renters of Santa Monica gave $1.50 per month to a tenants' union, its annual budget would be $1 million). Not only are such fund-raising efforts feasible, so are direct-mail campaigns (George McGovern raised millions in 1972 in that way) and the deliberate development of businesses and investments to generate political rather than personal capital. There is no possibility of winning political power without a stable coalition, stable institutions, stable programs, and no possibility of such stability without steady and planned fund raising.

Organization above egos: The Democratic Party is not so much an organization as it is a three-ring circus for individuals who are at best one-person "parties" or at worst prima donnas. More generally, the electoral as well as the nonelectoral left has had no stable and lasting organizations in recent memory. American individualist culture is not fertile ground for organizations, and politics is built more around the advancement of the person than the party. The frontier mentality has left an individualistic legacy across the political spectrum, making people feel that freedom requires purely individual accomplishment, individual anxiety, individual struggle. But there are pressing reasons for organization—local, state, national, inside and outside the two-party system and, above all, inside the individual mind, as a way of thinking. Change does not come by spontaneous events alone, though they are important. It is organization that wins victories and assures their implementation. It is organization that keeps people anchored to a larger picture of life than their personal ambitions. It is organization that teaches people how to be citizens rather than private souls, and how to work together instead of at one another's throats. Without organization, people will not commit their lives to social change.

The goal in the 1980s has to be the creation of a *new generation of leadership* through organization. At every level, inside and outside of party politics, in labor, business and the professions, there has to be a rising desire to win the power necessary for real self-determination. This will take determination, and also be training in the skills of organizing, planning, administering, servicing. A genuinely political organization should be "political" in more than the narrow sense of seeking an America that is more self-governing, in which people have the spirit and the know-how to make the decisions affecting their lives.

If there is any idea that has been identified with progressive rather than conservative thought down through time, it has been just this: that people can be trusted with more, not less, power over decisions that are now made by private and privileged interests. The test of the 1980s, and the coming Republican era, will be once again between democracy and the narrow vision of the few. □

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BOOKS & THE ARTS.

U. S. Army, Incorporated

PAUL L. SAVAGE

SELF-DESTRUCTION: The Disintegration and Decay of the United States Army During the Vietnam Era. *By Cincinnatus. W. W. Norton & Company. 288 pp. $15.95.*

Well before the fighting stopped in Vietnam, books scrutinizing our role in Southeast Asia began appearing in profusion. And the cascade of post-mortems created a virtual Vietnam industry in the publishing world. Most of these books by far dealt with the horrors of the war and the pros and cons of our involvement. Very few, however, took a hard look at the "merely" military aspects of the war, especially the condition and morale of our Army. Unless one is a pacifist, that is a critical area to explore, and *Self-Destruction* does so with considerable thrust.

An ancient military axiom holds that there are no bad soldiers, only bad officers. This was malignantly true during the Vietnam War, as this exposé by an officer who was there makes clear. Cincinnatus, the pseudonym of a career Army man who served as a captain during the Tet offensive in 1968, finds the officer corps criminally and provably derelict. He charges the senior colonels and generals with creating and nurturing a system driven by the basest of military motivation, utterly unenlightened self-interest coupled with a collectively neurotic obsession with career. Traditional and obligatory concerns for troop welfare, discipline, training and front-line leadership faded into frantic jockeying for preferential assignments, all encouraged by official policy. One hugely damaging policy permitted officers to serve six months in combat while requiring that their men serve the entire year's tour.

The pressures of career imperatives produced swarms of largely superfluous officers, mostly incompetent in counter-guerrilla warfare, clamoring for "command time" essential to climbing the promotion ladder. Because the dominant "management consciousness" of the Army required a steady multiplication of "war managers," cohesion and effectiveness disintegrated—due largely to the low quality of these transient "leaders." This collapse was reflected in large numbers of mutinies in battle, "fragging" and drug use and addiction at plague levels, along with mass desertions and AWOLs. Surrounding all this was an environment of bureaucratic, financial and political corruption.

The Central Intelligence Agency used its planes to fly heroin into Vietnam for sale by local officials to U.S. troops. Through American "management" of PX warehouses and ammunition depots, the Vietcong received a large percentage of its supplies from the United States. American soldiers were being killed by their own bullets, mortar rounds and mines. Not surprisingly, the effect on morale was enormous. By 1971, relationships between officers and men were characterized by mutual contempt, mistrust and open hatred.

Cincinnatus lays all this before us, supported by considerable authority, official and unofficial, including interviews with participants at all ranks. Those at the very top insisted they had won the war in a military sense, had performed effectively and that the Army remained in excellent fighting condition. Most striking is the isolated blindness of the high command, whose staffs in their own interests insulated the generals from the truth while managing statistical reporting systems (such as body counts) that put a premium on lying, self-deception and deceit. In the rare instance that a general officer admitted that the Army was in some trouble (never mind disintegrating), his explanation was inevitably the received wisdom that Vietnam was lost because of the lack of popular support at home.

This is an American variation of *Dolchstosslegende*, Ludendorff's World War I "stab in the back legend." It implies that somehow the Army was betrayed by weak-willed politicians, left-leaning moralists and spoiled college youth. Cincinnatus will have none of this. Nor does he buy the bleats of some generals he interviewed (anonymously) that they opposed many Vietnam policies: mass bombing, free-fire zones, defoliation, drug trafficking, body counting, statistical distortions. There is no record of extensive officer protest, written or otherwise, no history of generals resigning because of objectionable policy and no record of requests for relief from assignment.

The military apparatus and the doctrines that produced disintegration in Vietnam still rule today, with a conventional wisdom early associated with Robert McNamara. Essentially it is this: The Army is no different from any large corporation. It therefore can be made "cost-effective" using systems or cost-benefit analysis. The idea was to reshape the Army into the analogue of a large corporation. Its components were simply forms of spare parts, with the assembly of a fighting battalion no different from the assembly of an automobile. If thousands of parts were properly put together and "managed," it would run. As parts wore out, standardized replacements would keep it running. Fighting units now were interchangeable assets impersonally managed in an attritive war. Soldiers became mere replacement parts to be "managed" to their deaths. War and battle became a standardized and inflexible procedure.

Older military values, for all their considerable virtues (and often blockheaded faults), were replaced by the values of the marketplace and modern military-civil econometric models. The sense of the regiment, esprit, unit tradition and memories, of *legio nostra patria*, of immediate, known, trusted and approachable commanders, were all jettisoned in favor of the systems approach and cost-benefit efficiency. Unfortunately, all of this had little connection with combat effectiveness. The real effect was to degrade the combat capacity of the Army. Any competent cultural anthropologist could have advised the Army that as a military society it could only disintegrate under stress—as it did in Vietnam.

How to change all this? Cincinnatus calls for a "massive effort" to study and codify the lessons of our military past, "going all the way back to colonial times if necessary." For handy reference, he would computerize all this information. He would also require the

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Army to know the limits of its power, and to understand that it was, in fact, defeated in Vietnam—by an unkempt, undersized, ill-equipped but very well led force of jungle fighters. The implication is that awareness of fault will lead to self-correction. This strikes me as wishful in the extreme. Those who brought us Vietnam are still in charge and are unlikely to allow their stewardship to be intimately examined. Any thoroughgoing examination would, of course, find the generals culpable. And, after all, even they subscribe, if only with lip service, to the imperative that the commander is responsible for *everything* his command does or fails to do.

Through the good offices of his publisher, Cincinnatus contacted me by telephone and agreed to be interviewed. I asked him why he spared the generals by holding his hand in the end and not driving his spear home. "I am a gentle man," he replied. This response being unanswerable, I posed several questions about existing conditions in the Army. He said that "the effectiveness of the Army was 'C3,' not combat-effective for any lengthy period." Could the Army stand a Soviet assault in Europe? In his judgment, we would "disintegrate." Citing his own experience during a recent combat jump, he said the troops were simply "unprepared." As for our rescue attempt in Iran last year, "Some of the janitors at the Pentagon could have mounted a better operation."

Even today, Cincinnatus said, he finds himself surrounded by officers who believe we fought a counter-guerrilla war in Vietnam. He observed, correctly, that what we fought was a "mid-intensity" war, one for which we are "preparing" and a form of warfare effective neither against the Soviet Army nor the guerrilla wars we may face. In short, the Army remains woefully unprepared to wage any kind of non-nuclear warfare.

One reaction to the Prussian Army's defeat by Napoleon was the great reform that began in 1809. Because of demonstrable incompetence, 102 of 142 general officers were dismissed from the Prussian corps. The excellence of the subsequent Prussian-German Army was never again in question. No petrified bureaucracy reforms itself: It can only be purged.

Such a purge, though clearly imperative for today's U.S. Army, is hardly likely. The Reagan Administration is fully committed to the all-volunteer military, though by any measure it is a disaster. Last year, 52 percent of all recruits fell into category four—the lowest level of intelligence—and in most cases were untrainable due to functional illiteracy. Moreover, the Administration accepts the "econometric model" of the Hoover Institute, which in the past has buttressed the Army's obsession with managerialism. With Alexander Haig as Secretary of State, there can be little doubt that Ronald Reagan finds life among the generals congenial. This is a serious error, as Cincinnatus makes plain and as John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson discovered too late. □

Wrestling in the Dark

ELISABETH YOUNG-BRUEHL

INTO THE DARK: Hannah Arendt and Totalitarianism. *By Stephen J. Whitfield. Temple University Press. 338 pp. $18.95.*

Stephen Whitfield has written a peculiar book. It is at once an explication and vindication of Hannah Arendt's theory in *The Origins of Totalitarianism* and a repudiation of the political views that shaped Arendt's work. What Whitfield appreciatively grants Arendt as a historian of totalitarianism he denies her as a political thinker: rigor, consistency, practical judgment, a sense of social justice. Whitfield's book is at such cross-purposes because he thinks that Arendt diagnosed the century's great evil, totalitarianism, clearly and decisively, but then failed to prescribe the obvious preventative for future outbreaks: liberalism. "Arendt's failure to nurture a sufficient appreciation for liberalism suggests a significant discontinuity in her thought, a decline in concern for what sort of politics, viable under modern conditions and verified by modern history, might best resist a recurrence of the plague."

The great merit of Whitfield's book is that he has read slowly and carefully both Arendt's work (with the exceptions of her early German-language journalism and her posthumous volumes, *The Life of the Mind*) and all the commentaries upon it. He displays a genuine concern to present her views accurately. *Into the Dark* is a veritable catalogue of controversies—historical, theoretical and methodological—and it will be regarded as an important source book.

But Whitfield is no archivist. He searches through these controversies to weigh the result of Arendt's ability to see "in the dark," and draws a different lesson from her vision. As the book moves from *The Origins of Totalitarianism* to Arendt's later work, its tone changes; criticisms of her historical analysis give way to personal charges. After he has set forth the main elements of the controversy over Arendt's *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, for example, Whitfield considers her reticence about responding publicly to critics: "She could rarely be flushed out to present any defense at all." Arendt was elusive, he charges, because "she had gotten to like the climate on top of Olympus." No biographical evidence is summoned.

Any reader of this book must come away wondering how the woman of moral passion, independence and integrity presented in the opening chapters can later be so lacking in "moral resoluteness," so concerned with being original rather than right ("When she found she could not say anything new, she preferred to say something delphic"), so devoid of "fraternal warmth" toward her people, the Jews, so given to "the intellectually histrionic style." Whitfield's early criticisms are respectful; his later ones are acerbic, annoyed, petulant. His "Conclusion," where both modes meet, is a wrestling match.

Whitfield's annoyance with Hannah Arendt begins when he starts tracing her failure to allow her insights of the 1941-50 period "dominion over her later thought." Her chief theoretical failing after she left *The Origins of Totalitarianism* behind was that she, "of all people," disdained "one of the impediments—perhaps the major one—to the emergence of totalitarian movements." Illiberally, Arendt disregarded "the social question," "the persistence and intensification of want." Although he is aware that the very phenomenon he studies, totalitarianism, has rendered the simple designations conservative

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and liberal, reactionary and revolutionary, of almost no contemporary relevance, Whitfield insists that Arendt was a conservative about "the social question." Her book *On Revolution* "might have been titled *Against Revolution*," Whitfield argues, completely ignoring Arendt's respect for political revolutions and her warnings about the dangers of an American foreign policy based on fear of revolutions in the rest of the world.

Whitfield misses these points because he himself sees no need for either political or social revolutions. He thinks that the liberal democratic state, with its political parties, though imperfect, has "helped soften the blow of modernization and helped meet the needs of some of its victims"; so it, not revolution, is devoutly to be desired. Had Hannah Arendt looked to the examples of England and America, instead of to the dreary examples of European party systems, she would not have leapt up to support revolutionary councils as ideal political forms. Whitfield thinks that Arendt missed the obvious middle of the road by fusing her socioeconomic conservatism with such political radicalism. He seems entirely unaware that offering up the American Way as a model—a gesture that has not been well received when our statesmen have made it—is exactly what Hannah Arendt argued against: she felt that America had forgotten its own revolutionary political heritage.

In the final chapters of his book, Whitfield deals not with Arendt's political failings but with her moral obtuseness, evident particularly in her *Eichmann in Jerusalem*. Her "icy cold" judgments of the European *Judenräte* seem to him indicative of "excessive hostility" to the Jewish victims of Nazism. As a Jew, Arendt found the Jewish Councils' cooperation with the Nazi extermination program "the darkest chapter in the whole dark story." "Wrong done by my own people," she explained, "naturally grieves me more than wrong done by other peoples." This stance, and the judgments that followed from it, strike Whitfield as woefully inadequate; he agrees with Gershom Scholem that Hannah Arendt lacked *ahavat yisrael* (love for the people of Israel).

Because he can view Arendt's portrait of Adolf Eichmann as an elaboration of her "masterwork" on totalitarianism, Whitfield finds it compelling. But there was no criticism of the Jewish Councils in the masterwork (Whitfield does not ask why). Instead of doing what his high regard for Arendt's theory of totalitarianism might have suggested—that is, placing her later reflections on the Jewish Councils into the earlier theory and judging whether they fit—Whitfield constructs a biographical caricature. He claims that Arendt's people "never seem to have brought her any pride—only grief." In his view, she could not see the limited but valuable contributions made by the Jewish Councils; she could not see any Jewish heroism; she could not appreciate the desperate wartime efforts of the Zionists.

Arendt's views have been misconstrued many times since *Eichmann in Jerusalem* was published in 1963, and seldom without the almost ritualized charge that she was "heartless." The moral issues she raised—without explicitly exploring the criteria by which she made her judgments—are frightening and complex, laced as they are with terrifying memories. Especially when the Jewish Council leaders were well-intentioned, the issues are awful: Can cooperation with evil for some hoped-for future good be justified? Can a leader's decision to sacrifice some of his people to save others be justified? Should those on their way to death be given or spared information about what is in store for them? To be judged clearly, such issues must first be viewed clearly, and this Whitfield, like many before him, refuses to do. The many studies of the *Judenräte* written in the wake of Arendt's book are ethically bare; the vast increase in source material has not diminished the need for apologetics. Arendt herself was only dimly aware when she wrote *Eichmann in Jerusalem* that the judgments she had made called for philosophical reflection on just what it is that allows people to say, even when threatened with death or living death, "this is right" and "this is wrong." Her last work, *The Life of the Mind*, which Whitfield does not consider, was an effort to provide that reflection.

Convinced as he is that Hannah Arendt's work after *The Origins of Totalitarianism* is shaped—disastrously—by her alleged "loss of interest in modern tyranny," Whitfield does not see the concern with judgment that runs through Arendt's writings of the 1960s and into *The Life of the Mind*. Unlike

Translating Neruda

The Way to Macchu Picchu

John Felstiner. Taking as a text Pablo Neruda's brilliant sequence *Alturas de Macchu Picchu,* this many-faceted book forms an essay on the theory and practice of literary translation, a study of Neruda's career through 1945, and an interpretation of his major poem, all of which lead to a striking new poem in English, *Heights of Macchu Picchu,* printed here along with the original Spanish. Illustrated. $18.50

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Whitfield, Arendt looked to the Revolutionary Councils and "participatory democracy," not to liberalism, for political defense against tyranny; for personal defense against tyranny, she looked to thinking and judging. The concerns of her first book never faded from her view. In the last year of her life, at a Bicentennial celebration, Arendt once again called upon Americans to look to their revolutionary heritage—for defense against emergent political tendencies that looked quite ominously familiar to her as a student of totalitarianism. Had he studied this address, "Home to Roost," Stephen Whitfield's liberal optimism and his assessment of Hannah Arendt's "loss of interest in modern tyranny" might have been shaken. □

'You Are Something Else'

FRANK MACSHANE

JESUS TALES. *By Romulus Linney. Foreword by Reynolds Price. North Point Press. 148 pp. $10.*

The search for the historical Jesus is as old as Christianity and has been a source of controversy throughout the history of the Church. In recent times, with the discovery of the Dead Sea Scrolls and new investigations into gnosticism, it has taken on new life. Most of these scholarly efforts to uncover facts about the life of Jesus have tended to reduce his significance. If new facts contradict the authorized life of Jesus as recorded in the New Testament, they are thought to undermine Christianity itself.

Few laymen have questioned the value of historical investigations of this kind into the life of Jesus. They accept them as a legitimate part of modern scholarship and scientific research. Yet what surely counts, given the incompleteness of the evidence available, is not the historical Jesus but what men have made of his story. Over the centuries, his life has been transformed into something with profound psychological reverberations and a cumulative historical importance. The myth of Christ is what is important, what the life signifies, not what is historically documented.

In older religions, this has long been an accepted attitude. Stories, most of them apocryphal, exist about Krishna, Parvati, Gautama Buddha and Confucius. They have entered the mainstream of the world's culture and carry an emotional power that no amount of historical investigation will ever diminish. Sir James Frazer's *Golden Bough* is a monument to this triumph of human imagination and ingenuity over historical accuracy.

Romulus Linney has long been interested in historical figures whose lives still echo down the years. As a playwright, he has resurrected two figures, Frederick the Great and Lord Byron, who attract us by their complexity and daring. He has now turned, as a fiction writer, to Jesus.

The title, *Jesus Tales*, is accurate but limiting. The book contains stories about, and inspired by, Jesus, but they are so fresh and alive that the word "tale" seems inadequate. Drawing upon the Apocrypha and a number of legendary stories about Jesus that have circulated in Europe and America, Linney has relied mainly on his imaginative skills as a novelist. Attracted to those aspects of the life of Jesus that do not receive much treatment in the Gospels of Matthew, Mark, Luke and John, he writes about the more human and less doctrinaire side of Christ. He concentrates on the birth, childhood and youth of Jesus—the experiences that helped form his character and personality.

Linney's success is largely due to his dramatic sense and his ear. He uses a spare, sharp dialogue that owes a good deal to modern Jewish humor. His characters speak in the sardonic, wistful and resigned manner often found in the work of such writers as Malamud and Singer. When Mary tells Joseph that even though she is pregnant, she is still a virgin, he answers, "Honey, I am ninety-one years old. I just don't want to hear talk like that." When the baby Jesus is born, Mary tells an acquaintance about three old men who came to the cave where she was resting with the child. "Three drunks," says Joseph. Mary reminds him there were three shepherds as well. "They got drunk, too," Joseph answers.

As he grows up, Jesus is considered a prankster and nuisance by the townspeople of Nazareth. He performs miracles almost unwittingly, and the people say, "He's a Child Terror." He's accused of being a pyromaniac and of being a bad influence on his friends, like any unruly kid in a group of teen-agers. "He bewitches them," say the parents.

Most of Linney's book is devoted to the relationship between St. Peter and Jesus as they go about the countryside together. They are portrayed as a pair of vagabonds, with Jesus performing the miracles necessary to produce loaves and fishes for dinner. St. Peter is revealed as rather earnest and literal-minded. Jesus, by contrast, is loose, impetuous, seemingly irresponsible, more interested in human beings than in justice or reason. There is nothing sanctimonious or preachy about either of them. They drink a lot, they stay up all night, play jokes on each other. They have a good time and enjoy their picaresque adventures. St. Peter acts as a kind of Sancho Panza for Jesus. He allows him to forget his sorrows for a while. To Jesus, says Linney, "Peter was a sudden laying down of a great burden. He was music starting, people kidding around, blind good will and passing contentment, the things that let people bear their deaths and crosses."

But the relationship between the two irritates St. Peter's wife, Perpetua, and their lame daughter, Petronella. They wonder out loud why Jesus doesn't cure her lameness if he's such a great magician. "All kinds of crazy people like Jesus think they are God," says Perpetua. "And plenty of crazy people like you worship them. One bunch where I grew up did it buck naked."

Linney's stories are in the folk tradition—there are several Jesus and Peter stories from the district of Friuli collected in Italo Calvino's recently published *Italian Folktales*. But as a novelist, Linney has been more daring and original in his treatment of this material. Recognizing the risks inherent in any treatment of a subject that is already overfamiliar, he has avoided the more famous aspects of the life of Jesus and brought forth his subject in a fresh manner. The stories are funny and warm and in good taste. They also add a good deal to our understanding of the legend of Jesus. Linney's interpretation rings true for our time in the same way

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that Bunyan's rather different *Pilgrim's Progress* did for its.

"You are something else," says St. Peter to Jesus. "That's right," comes the reply. "Follow me." □

ART.

LAWRENCE ALLOWAY

Robert Hughes is the art critic for *Time*. Earlier this year, people were talking about him in *Vogue*, and Exxon was taking out full-page ads for him in *The New Yorker*. The occasion was *The Shock of the New*, a book based on eight television programs he wrote for the British Broadcasting Corporation, which are now appearing in the United States on public television. Hughes's work represents a significant point in the popularization of art. In his *Time* articles, clarity comes through with pizazz and his topicality with a secure data base. Only rarely do lapses of taste crop up, as when he calls Bernini "that marble megaphone of 17th-century papal dogma." Hughes has taken hold of a great deal of information and made it easily accessible.

The Shock of the New (Alfred A. Knopf, 423 pp., $29.95) is a fast, readable survey of modern art, more or less chronological, but with thematic groupings. Here are the movements of Cubism, Dada, Surrealism, Expressionism, Field Painting and Pop Art. Expressionism comes out of sequence so that Hughes can link it with Field Painting in "The View From the Edge," but the idea is awkward. As a journalistic art writer, Hughes wants to give his readers more denouements than a straight-line chronicle affords. His best theme, one that runs through several sections, is the relation of art and technology. "The Mechanical Paradise" deals with early optimistic views of the machine and "The Faces of Power" with the disillusionment caused by World War I; here Hughes pairs Dada and Constructivism, which works. Also in this vein, "Trouble in Utopia" shows the collapse of functionalist theories of architecture.

Hughes interrupts this logical sequence with "The Landscape of Pleasure," in which thematic freedom turns into special pleading. He stretches the notion of a Mediterranean tradition to legitimize two American artists. He discusses Matisse and Fauvism and then introduces Robert Motherwell and Richard Diebenkorn as "two California-born painters." Motherwell may have been born there, but most New Yorkers are born somewhere else: he has been identified for all of his working life with Manhattan. At any rate, he is Hughes's American hero who reconciles violence and sensibility. By comparison, Willem de Kooning is a Soutine follower, and Clyfford Still and Barnett Newman are dismissed contemptuously for their dull color and "bombastic" theories.

According to Hughes, the BBC "insisted" on the title *The Shock of the New* and he writes as if it were not his responsibility. It is, of course, a crude patching of Harold Rosenberg's *Tradition of the New* and Alvin Toffler's *Future Shock*. Well, that's TV for you. Hughes would have been foolish not to keep the title of the show for the book, but it does commit him to the packaging. It is odd that someone who is so amenable to being marketed on a large scale should attack commercial influences in art: "All vanguard art activity," Hughes declares, is "gutted by the market."

The Shock of the New is the first popular book on twentieth-century art based on the assumption that our period marks the end of modernism. Hughes is not antimodern, like Thomas Craven or Hilton Kramer, but he has taken the phasing-out of the ideas and practices of earlier twentieth-century art as his subject. He details not the formal achievements of modernism, which have been endlessly debated, but the social and ideological weaknesses and failures that have had only specialist audiences until now. He draws attention to the failure of Surrealism to relate its revolution to Communism. He dismisses Field Painting. He nominates various concluding works: " 'Guernica' was the last great history painting" and "the Rothko Chapel is the last silence of Romanticism."

In the section "Culture as Nature," Hughes takes Toffler's notion of information-overload to argue that Pop Art cannot compete on the street with the real thing. I always liked Pop Art, but never thought of it as a contender with the products of popular culture; it only quoted them. Hughes also thinks that what he calls "the pop sensibility" has weakened art's humanistic power to embody subtle, long-term meanings. It is ridiculous to think that one kind of art can spoil the whole barrel. The drama of Hughes's style, however, depends on the appearance of conflict, great exits and endings and contagious irreconcilabilities.

The title is not the only concession Hughes made to TV, as anybody knows who saw the first program. Hughes takes the Eiffel Tower, which was—as is well-known thanks to Meyer Schapiro—a symbol for early twentieth-century pro-technology intellectuals. In his commentary, Hughes says that the tower is anthropomorphic, a kind of metal Colossus of Rhodes; but the sound track plays an Offenbach can-can. The tower is not only dancing: it is a woman. This vulgarity leads to World War I documentary photographs, followed by banal clips of Edison, the Lumière brothers, Marconi, the Wright brothers (with sound effects), Albert Einstein (with formula), Henry Ford and Blériot. Through all this, on camera or voice-over, Robert Hughes is breathless and pushy, a TV natural in his mix of the portentous and the affable.

Why is Hughes's book better than his TV programs? The audience is smaller, for one thing; he can flash more confidently the skin of humanism essential to his values—as it is to all journalistic art writers. Another problem in showing art on TV is one of translation. Art works suit neither the shape of the screen, which is round-cornered and sloping, nor the flickering surface. The illusive porous field is absolutely unlike the surfaces that artists paint and draw upon, whereas a reproduction on a page has a surreptitious kinship with the original. This is a fundamental structural problem that Hughes seems to have made no effort to tackle: he accepts partially masked screens for reproductions of a low order of specificity. His programs worked best when showing the information around art, rather than the objects themselves. The

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book, on the other hand, is cleanly laid out and the text can count on 150 illustrations (half of them in color) showing what the author says is there.

In his concluding section, "The Future That Was," Hughes points out that the art movement as a form of organization has been "eclipsed" since 1965 and that the decade of the 1970s developed a "sense of cultural pluralism." However, any pleasure he might feel at stylistic diversity emerging from the disintegration of modernism seems overwhelmed by his distaste for art's "convertibility into cash." He makes no attempt to consider the distribution of art beyond the market, such as the alternative space system, and limits himself to artists ratified by dealers. For instance, the copious realist revival is indicated by two artists, Philip Pearlstein and Avigdor Arikha. The latter is represented by the Marlborough Gallery, and the one woman illustrated in the chapter is a conceptual artist with the Leo Castelli Gallery. Hughes's tastes seem identical to those of the system that he admonishes. □

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THEATER.

STEPHEN HARVEY

Macbeth

The most astonishing thing about the *Macbeth* currently at the Vivian Beaumont is that a fledgling institution such as the Lincoln Center Theater Company actually assembled so assured and occasionally thrilling a production. By rights, *Macbeth* should have been a fruitless gamble—entrusting the most booby-trapped of the standard Shakespeare works to a director who had never staged a spoken drama, and providing her with an arena suited only to the mounting of opening-night cast parties. Yet the selection of Sarah Caldwell to direct was, in fact, a stroke of inspiration. Decades in opera have schooled her in the practice of orchestrating masses of performers in vast expanses into a unified crescendo of theatrical excitement, and that's precisely what she's achieved at the Beaumont.

With spare panoply, she has staged this play as a swift succession of vivid, shadowy tableaux; if anything, her manner of dissolving from one image to another, accompanied by the rumblings and flourishes of an unseen orchestra, doesn't seem so much operatic as cinematic in inspiration. Caldwell bisects the daunting heights of the Beaumont stage with a steel-scaffold catwalk designed by Herbert Senn and Helen Pond, which variously serves as Duncan's royal seat, Banquo's ghostly haunt and the ramparts of Dunsinane. While the set necessitates a considerable amount of noisy clambering up and down, it affords some indelibly apt imagery—particularly as Banquo paces aloft at right angles to the table of unseeing revelers attending Macbeth's post-coronation banquet. Even on terra firma, Caldwell gives this production an almost unerring visual and dramatic precision—no mean accomplishment considering the almost insurmountable drawbacks of the Beaumont stage. Macbeth's ascension to the throne is focused way upstage, emphasizing the diminished moral stature and mortal frailty of the assassin and his queen. Lady Macbeth's soliloquies are shaped like stark arias of soulless alienation; pierced by an icy shaft of light, she glides fleetly to the apron of the stage to vent her bile and harvest her woe.

Caldwell's gifts apply to the spoken language as well. Although gathered solely for this production, the cast could easily pass muster as an experienced ensemble company—something currently beyond the reach of the Brooklyn Academy of Music troupe, expressly formed with that aim in mind (see "Theater," *The Nation*, February 14). These actors achieve a uniformly high mean level of vocal force and clarity, and display at least a fair share of interpretive skills to match. I can't think of a single production of *Macbeth* that quite solved the problem of those all-too-literal witches and their persistent intrusions. Caldwell at least manages a brave try by casting them into darkness and schooling them to chant much of their incantation in dissonant song, emphasizing their otherworldliness.

Neil Vipond's somewhat recessive Duncan makes the weakest impression among the supporting players, largely because this roster otherwise possesses such vigor and confidence. James Hurdle's Ross is the underplayed image of the gruff, dour Scot, and J. Kenneth Campbell contributes a Macduff of blistering outrage and virility. In this *Macbeth*'s most stirring moment, the Lady Macduff of Kaiulani Lee simply couldn't be bettered; her firm chin and darting eyes simultaneously express the woman's unshakable dignity and disbelieving terror at the fate awaiting her and her children. Maureen Anderman creates a Lady Macbeth who is both sinuously feminine and genuinely sinister, as she peels back her lips to bare the teeth of an eager carnivore. Her anxious prevarication in the face of Macbeth's madness at the feast hits a startling note of queasy comedy—she's the bewildered hostess par excellence, frantically trying to divert her guests from the spectacle of her husband's awful social gaffes.

Yet the real tragedy presented by the Caldwell *Macbeth* is Philip Anglim's unavailing struggle in the title role. That he fails to grasp all the near-thankless demands of this part is a pity, but no real surprise—the odds were stacked against this relatively untried actor from the start. Macbeth is a character of almost insuperable contradictions. He is a staunch warrior who also commits the most gratuitous sanguinary acts, yet he remains essentially passive at base—prodded by his wife and credulously preyed upon by those cauldron-stirring Harpies. In times past, even such sterling Shakespeareans as Guinness, Rich-

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ardson and Gielgud have jousted with Macbeth and lost. In 1978, at the National Theater in London, Albert Finney tried to screw his courage to the sticking place, and merely got pilloried for his pains. Finney was subsequently upstaged by Peter O'Toole's rendition at the Old Vic last fall. O'Toole so convulsed the critics that his debacle rivaled Margaret Thatcher's economic policies as front-page copy in the English press. Even those rare actors who have triumphed in the part learned when to stop pressing their luck. Laurence Olivier scrupulously filmed his Henry, Richard, Hamlet and Othello, but seemed content to let his Macbeth, considered definitive in its time, remain a theatrical memory.

From the moment Anglim strides onto the stage of the Beaumont, he looks thoroughly spooked. There's a benumbed glaze to his stare, and his Macbeth never convinces us that those are floating daggers and regicides, past and future, careening past his line of vision. Anglim strains valorously to win us with a stalwart array of diversionary tactics. Anyone who remembers the genteel, introverted tenor of his Elephant Man may well be jolted by the resonant baritone with which his Macbeth declaims. If sound were all, this would be an eminently satisfying performance; Anglim has a true command of the sense and rhythm of the poetry, even while the uncertainty of his swordplay makes you quail nearly as much for the actor during Act V as you presumably should for Macbeth himself. It's not as though Anglim had revealed himself to be utterly ill-matched to Shakespearean roles. In fact, the combination of this actor's compelling voice and callow, tentative aura imply that he'd be rather more comfortable—and persuasive—stalking through Elsinore than defending the crumbling battlements of Dunsinane.

Splendid though it is to watch and listen to, this *Macbeth* never really penetrates to the viscera of the play, and Anglim's pallidness may be the principal reason. But there's no denying the stubbornly resistant nature of the work under the best of circumstances. Shakespeare's tide of carnage rushes so inexorably that it engulfs the viewer along with the dramatis personae; there's scarcely time for anyone to ponder the emotional crosscurrents underneath. The Caldwell *Macbeth* leaves you longing for that catharsis which likewise eluded so many of her predecessors, but her production is still the most ravishing display of *son et lumière* in town. □

FILMS.

ROBERT HATCH

Like a Turtle on Its Back
Inside Moves
The Incredible Shrinking Woman

Three current pictures, though their aims are modest and their achievement of them successful only up to a point, are doing well because they share a theme to which the public strongly responds. They are about little people with big problems. That human condition has always prevailed and fiction has always drawn on it, but today it is perhaps especially poignant. As the social machine grows steadily larger, we, its cogs, see ourselves as proportionately smaller. And misery loves company.

For the first half of *Like a Turtle on Its Back*, Paul (Jean-François Stevenin) is in that position, futilely waving his arms and legs in the air. He is suffering from a severe and prolonged attack of writer's block. Six years ago he published a novel that was sufficiently well received; since then everything he has been able to get down on paper is either fatuous or pretentious (as the quoted extracts make only too clear). His wife (Bernadette Lafont), a patient woman, has gone back to work to keep them in bed and board, and he spends the days scrabbling through reams of manuscript like a squirrel searching for nuts. Finding none, he brandishes an oversized pen to eliminate sentences, paragraphs, whole pages and finally the title itself of his stubbornly unborn work. When this self-punishment becomes intolerable, Paul sneaks off to afternoon movies, picks up whores, drinks beer with a colleague similarly beset and wanders the streets commiserating with himself.

Paul's predicament is at once touching and funny. It surmounts its inherent monotony because Stevenin is an ingeniously eloquent actor, a man of squat and awkward body, of heavy but sensitive face, who can galvanize himself from apathy to furiously misdirected activity, with droll effect. But, dramatically speaking, the film seems for quite some time to be as static as its title would suggest.

Then, about halfway, Camille, the wife, decides that a life spent feeding and mothering her mute genius is insufficiently rewarding—particularly when he tactlessly informs her that he is impotent only at home. She flings him out of the flat and, abstracted by misery, he begins to suffer the indignities of a vagrant in Paris. He is set upon by thieves, savagely beaten by sadistic police, accepted on credit—implausibly, I thought—at a fleabag hotel, where he shares a room with an enigmatic black man, one who generously offers him cocaine and whose occupation takes him into the streets at night in exceedingly sharp clothing. Thus situated, Paul is released from the compulsion to write by the more immediate need to survive. He sits down and types out in no time at all a first-rate novel, complete with a quotation from Edmund Wilson in the half-title. The black man is gratified, a publisher provides an advance and Camille is seen waiting under an umbrella in the dawn of a new day.

This is Luc Beraud's first film, a work he both wrote (in collaboration with Claude Miller) and directed. His unlikely idea of making a moving picture about a man whose problem is that he cannot move works well. He looks at the case both compassionately and with satiric awareness of its follies, and

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

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Stevenin abets him with a virtuoso demonstration of the malady. But Beraud advances the idea without having devised a story to carry it through. Paul has substance as long as he is blocked, but once set free he becomes a lay figure being manipulated toward a happy ending. However, for half its duration, *Like a Turtle on Its Back* is a considerable achievement.

In the opening minutes of Richard Donner's *Inside Moves*, a young man enters a building, rides the elevator to the tenth floor and jumps out the window of an unoccupied office, landing on the roof of a parked car and being rushed to a hospital for extensive surgery. From that point on, the film is sturdily upbeat, with only momentary dips into misfortune for dramatic variety. As the ad says, *Inside Moves* "will make you feel good"; it is a jolly version of *The Iceman Cometh*.

Rory the defenestrator (John Savage), we learn in time, had taken the plunge for no specific reason, but because he felt like nothing and knew that nobody cared. However, once the doctors have patched him up as best they can, he hobbles out of the hospital and into Max's Bar; he is looking for a beer, but finds a family and a home. Max is a publican who so loves his customers that he is rapidly approaching bankruptcy. Jerry, his bartender (David Morse), is a collector of sick cats (his girlfriend is a junkie whore perilously close to the age of consent) and he quickly takes Rory in hand, introducing him to as merry a bunch of cripples as ever played poker in a neighborhood saloon. One of them is blind; another has two prosthetic hands; a third is a resolutely jovial black man confined to a wheelchair. They invite Rory to join the game.

As in O'Neill's play, the newcomer is a spokesman for reality, but instead of robbing these outcasts of their dreams, Rory makes them come true. Jerry, it seems, could be a star basketball player but for the fact that he has a bad leg and no money to get it fixed. Rory takes care of that. He also becomes the bar's manager, making it boom and protecting the cash register from Max's susceptible heart. He wins the love of the beautiful waitress, convinces Jerry that he must heal his crippled soul as well as his gimpy leg and, on the night of the big game, shepherds the whole crowd from Max's to the auditorium, where they can warm themselves in the spectacle of their own beloved bartender sinking baskets from every corner of the court.

All of this is carried out in high bravura style; Jan Steen never painted a more affecting scene of bibulous affection, and it would be a hard heart that did not rejoice in the happiness of these earthy, spunky friends. As advertised, it makes you feel good, even though the contents are more froth than lager.

As for *The Incredible Shrinking Woman*, it is literally, if somewhat fantastically, about a little person with a big problem. "Suggested" by a novel called *The Shrinking Man*, the film is set in Tasty Meadows, a suburb in the heartland of consumerism. Pat Kramer, played by Lily Tomlin (who doubles as Judith Beasley, a door-to-door cosmetics salesperson, and is also seen briefly as a very rude phone operator), is married to a rising ad executive and is herself an enthusiastic user of every product that can be wrapped in plastic, preserved with additives or shot from an aerosol can. As atrocious bad luck would have it, though, some combination of the ingredients in the deodorants, hair sprays, antiseptics, polishes, detergents, seasonings and homogenized nourishments that line Pat's shelves and jam her refrigerator have so altered her internal chemistry that she has, suddenly and rapidly, begun to grow smaller.

The doctors readily, and a bit complacently, discover the cause of her unusual predicament, but are quite unable to suggest a cure. And for their part, America's product manufacturers are united in their determination that the cause shall not be revealed until a (presumably marketable) antidote is discovered. One group, more malign and farsighted than its peers, undertakes to kidnap Pat and make from her blood a serum which, placed in the nation's water supply, would reduce the average stature of the populace to that of a dashboard Holy Family and leave these wicked manipulators the giant rulers of the land.

I can't reveal how this dangerous crisis is resolved because I didn't at all understand how it was done, but it is clear enough that Joel Schumacher's film is a parable about contemporary life. It tells how we are belittled by the merchants of our conveniences and it names them all: manufacturers, public relations firms, advertising agencies, scientists, doctors and government representatives, not to mention our very selves: Pat, shrunk to two feet, appears on TV with Mike Douglas (played by himself) to thank the listening public for the hundreds and hundreds of understanding letters she has received.

But it happens that the message also comes as a packaged product—a middle-class domestic comedy with the usual ingredients of cunning kiddies, frisky dog, super kitchen and late-model car on a street of split-level ranchettes inhabited by goofy, gabby neighbors. As the frolic progresses, the formula submerges the satire. The film is bright and prosperous, rocking with self-induced laughter, and parents are queuing up with their own kids to see it. The youngsters shout at the spectacle of the indomitable Lily Tomlin scaling a chair as big as a castle, or collapsing under a box of cereal. They are convulsed when she falls down the drain of the garbage disposal unit, squeal with happy terror at the sight of her in a bird cage, captive of the mad scientist who wants her blood, but soon to be saved by the compassionate gorilla in the cage next door. Probably none of this will do them any harm, but somehow I doubt that the message is getting across to the children or their parents. I'm always grateful when some director takes a Swiftian kick at our corporate overlords, and too often disappointed when he excuses the temerity by explaining that it was only meant in fun—in this case, Lewis Carroll's fun. □

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Crossword Puzzle No. 1856

FRANK W. LEWIS



ACROSS

1 and 6 That's all right, but everyone should be in a healthy religious environment! (3,4,3,4)
10 and 26 down What those taking a chance might be doing in creating art a-plenty! (7,4)
11 Put down Charles X, otherwise? (7)
12 Beats getting up, at less trouble! (8)
13 A belt woven out of board! (5)
15 It might be more comfortable with this down. (5)
17 Where some hope to find military (or even State Department!) leadership, by and large. (2,7)
19 Transgresses how Oklahoma transport ends up on top? (9)
21 Loots containers for wines? (5)
23 Had to be admitted, too. (5)
24 Orderly/corpsman, although briefly inside. (8)
27 What jumped over the fence last sounds like "so they lived happily ever after!" (4-3)
28 The Merchant of Venice? You might find it a no-no! (7)
29 See 4 down
30 Way up front? Certainly not! (10)

DOWN

1 Said incorrectly to be of some benefit. (4)
2 Combined with fever, shown the way around it. (7)
3 "Times" issues, possibly. (5)
4 and 29 across Fast guns for gangsters? They might keep the place from being hit. (9,4)
5 On bows and arrows, they sound like solid hits. (5)
7 It traditionally has bright blue weather. (7)
8 With which one would be slightly better off? (6,4)
9 They used to be split right down the middle, but not the farewell type. (8)
14 Does one that really flies make the pilot cheer? (10)
16 Sounds like a downpour, sweetheart! (As a drawer, could it be associated with Christmas?) (8)
18 It could be much more dangerous than simple intestinal disturbance, even though masked. (3,6)
20 Hankered for, as one imagined. (7)
22 I can hit such a sort placed on the table, perhaps. (7)
24 Aimed incorrectly, it could be blasted by politicians and others. (5)
25 Shortly 7 down (and in Paris, too!) will perhaps be played. (5)
26 See 10 across

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE 1855

ACROSS: 1 Law of averages; 9 Uhlan; 10 Unitarian; 11 English; 12 Violent; 13 Along; 14 Australia; 16 Deerflies; 18 Angle; 19 Anagram; 21 Flattop; 22 Deadlines; 23 Ashen; 24 Edgar Allan Poe. DOWN: 1 Laurel and Hardy; 2 Wild goose; 3 Funding; 4 Vouch; 5 Reinvests; 6 Glamour; 7 Shine; 8 Initial expense; 14 Asia Minor; 15 Lightship; 17 Foreleg; 18 Alabama; 20 Adage; 21 Fusil.

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A Third Interview With The 115-Year-Old Magazine

Your mellow wisdom, gained from your 115 years of weekly existence, has enlightened us in the past. Now I'm wondering if there is some secret of the meaning of life that you would like to share with us?

Secrets? You want secrets, go file a Freedom of Information Act request. I don't believe in secrets. That's why I proposed the Spy Library.

The Spy Library? What's that?

It's an open-shelf library containing all of our current secrets. It would be open to all spies who can prove a sincere interest in espionage. They could search through the card catalogues and check out any secrets they like.

But I don't understand. Wouldn't th[illegible]e helping them do their work?

Oh, no. You see, under the present classification system the Government does the spies' work for them. Now our secrets are labeled according to their importance—Top Secret, for the really big stuff, down to Confidential, for small-potatoes secrets. In the Spy Library, the foreign agents would have to figure out for themselves what's important.

I see. Do you have any other ideas like that?

Oh sure. All the time. My Swiss missile bank, for example. It would solve the problem of stationing U.S. missiles in Europe. We'd deposit them in Swiss bank accounts, and the trusty Swiss bankers would hide them in various Alps. As everybody knows, you can trust a Swiss banker to keep a secret. So the Europeans wouldn't have to worry about missiles on their soil and the Soviet Union wouldn't feel threatened.

I thought *The Nation* was a serious magazine of current affairs and the arts. Those ideas sound like *Mad* magazine.

My friend, it's a mad world. Sometimes the most outrageous ideas make more sense than what our Government is selling. Take the MX missile. Only Alfred E. Neuman could have dreamed that one up. Most of the time, though, I just try to make sense out of the world as it comes. And if *you* subscribe to *The Nation*, maybe you can too. Just fill out that handy coupon over on the right.

The Nation.

P.O. Box 1953 Marion, Ohio 43305

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